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Summary findings
In  discussing  the causes  and  consequences  of large capital  it can  help  moderate  or even  offset  the  induced
inflows  to developing  countries,  Goldstein  emphasizes  expansion  of domestic  credit.  But with  high capital
that:  mobility,  sterilization  becomes  more  expensive  and  less
* Although  there  are  legitimate  grounds  for  an  effective  the longer  it is used.
optimistic  long-term  outlook  on private  capital  flows to  Effective  regulation  and  supervision  are important  in
developing  countries,  there  is little  to suggest  that  the  ensuring  the  best  use of large  inflows  of  foreign
volatility  of capital  flows will end.  In designing  policy  resources.  It  makes a big difference,  for  example,  if banks
strategies  to accommodate  this  volatility,  a premium  use their  higher  reserves  to lend  for productive
should  be put  on credibility,  resilience,  and  flexibility.  investment  and  human  capital  formation  than  if they  use
- Country  differences  notwithstanding,  host  countries  them  to fund  speculative  activities  that  eventually
need  to respect  the basics  of adjustment  and  finance  in  translate  into  nonperforming  loans  (and  perhaps  a large
designing  their  policy  response  to large  inflows.  public  sector  liability  as well).  Careful  assessment  of
Host  countries  that  want  to keep using  the  nominal  credit  risk and  of maturity  mismatches  are essential  if
exchange  rate  as their  key nominal  anchor  and that  do  banks  are to help  the  private  sector  earn  a rate  of return
not  want  to  accept  much  appreciation  in their  real  greater  than  the  cost  of capital.  Similarly,  good  disclosure
exchange  rate  must  be prepared  to  tighten  fiscal policy.  and accounting  standards  are  essential  for accurate
This is the  most  reliable  way to reduce  aggregate  pricing  of risk  in both  banking  and securities  markets.
demand,  keep  inflation  in check,  and  limit deterioration  These  and  similar  measures  are worth  implementing  even
of the current  account.  without  large capital  inflows.
Regarding  sterilization  policy,  domestic  interest  rates  Beyond  dealing  with  surges  in capital  inflows,  host
will be higher  and  the size of the  inflow  will be larger  countries  must  decide  the optimal  speed  at which  they
with  sterilization  than  without  it. Not  that  sterilization  wish  to move  toward  full capital  account  liberalization.
necessarily  need be avoided;  in the early  stages of inflow,
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Any international economist who at the height of the debt crisis foresaw that developing
countries would be facing in the early 1990s a surge of private capital inflows, and that the host
countries  would  regard  these  capital  inflows  as  a  mixed  blessing,  might  well  have  been
encouraged  to  go  into  analysis  --  and  not  the  kind  of  analysis carried  out  in  economics
departments.  Yet as the title of this paper suggests, such a forecast would have been right on the
mark.  The fact is that a group of developing countries has been wrestling over the past  five
years (1990-94) with how to conduct macroeconomic, exchange rate, and supervisory policy in
the face  of a  cumulative, net (long-term) private  capital inflow that is on  the order  of  $540
billion.  1
This time, it has been portfolio capital (bonds and equities) and foreign direct investment
--  and  not  bank  loans  --  that  have led  the way;  it  has  been the  private  sector  --  and  not
governments-- that has been the major borrower;  it has been Asia along with Latin America --
not just  the latter region alone -- that has been the main destination for such flows; and  it has
been creditors -- not debtors -- that have borne most of the currency risk.  In another contrast
with the buildup to the debt crisis, this time the capital inflow has been preceded or accompanied
by significant progress in macroeconomic policy reform and in liberalization in the developing
countries.  And economic growth -- such a key problem in indebted countries during the debt
crisis and its immediate aftermath -- has been more buoyant this time.2
Still,  some of the same concerns that surfaced in earlier capital inflow episodes  about
safeguarding macroeconomic stability, about losses in competitiveness, about a weakening of
domestic  saving  efforts,  about preventing  inflows from  exacerbating strains  in  the domestic
banking system, and about overborrowing and unsustainable current account positions, have been
at the center  of  the policy debate  in  this episode as  well.  The recent  crisis  in  Mexico,  by
underlining both the volatility of private capital flows and the potential for contagion to other
developing-country borrowers, has if anything added to these concerns.
1 This figure is taken from the World Bank's World Debt Tables. 1994-95 (World Bank [1994]).  Only estimated
figures are yet available for 1994 and these do n=t  take into account any significant net outflow from Mexico near the
end of 1994.  Also note that the World Bank figures cover only long-term private net flows.  If an estimate of short-
term net private capital flows is added to the long-term numbers, the cumulative total for 1990-94 probably lies close
to $630 billion.
The high-inflow developing countries of Asia recorded an average growth rate of better than 7 percent over the
1990-94 period, while growth in the high-inflow countries of Latin America was above 2 percent (IMF [1994]).
IThis paper provides a nontechnical  summary  and critique  of the existing literature  on the
causes and consequences  of these large private capital inflows  to developing  countries. 3 The
emphasis  is on the policy  choices  faced  by authorities,  and on the lessons  of country  experience.
The plan for the paper is as follows.  Section II  outlines the broad patterns in recent
private capital  inflows (size, composition,  regional  and country  concentration,  and cross-country
differences).  It  also summarizes  the macroeconomic  developments  that have most typically
accompanied  such  capital  inflows. Section  11 discusses  the factors  -- both external  and internal  -
- that appear to be responsible  for the resurgence  of these private capital inflows, and considers
what these factors imply about "sustainability"  of flows over the medium-term.  Section IV
explains the kinds of challenges  and concerns raised by large capital inflows, and analyzes  the
policy options  employed  by host countries  to deal with such inflows. Finally, Section  V offers
three policy  lessons  that seem  justified  by recent  experience.
II.  Patterns:  Private  Capital  Inflows  and Associated  Developments
Capital  flows
This paper analyzes  private net capital  flows to developing  countries. Private flows now
account  for approximately  three-quarters  of all long-term  capital  flows to developing  countries
(World  Bank [1994]). The decision  to concentrate  on private  flows  means that (aside  from China
and India) the group of host countries consists predominantly  of middle-income  developing
countries. Because  low-income  countries  rely much  more on official  flows to meet their external
financing  needs and because  official net flows have not shown the same surge in the 1990s as
private flows, the behavior  of official  flows and its implication  for low income  countries  require
separate  treatment.
There are  four characteristics of  recent, private net  capital inflows to  developing
countries that warrant explicit mention (see World Bank [1994], Calvo et al [1995, 1993],
Fernandez-Arias  and Montiel  [1995]).
First, the size of the private capital inflow into developing  countries over the past five
years has been larg;  how large depends  on what you compare  it to.  Tables 1 and 2 lay out the
relevant  figures. The cumulative  private net (long-term)  inflow  over the 1990-94  period amounts
to  roughly $540 billion (adding official flows would double that total).  Particularly large
3  The task is made easier by  the availability  of a group of excellent  recent survey articles (Calvo et  al
[1993,1994a,1995],  Corbo and Hernandez  [1993], Fernandez-Arias  and Montiel [1995], IMF [1994], Khan and
Reinhart  [1995],  Schadler  et al [1993],  Wang  and Schilling  [1995],  and  World  Bank  [1994]).
2Table 1. Private Net Long-Term Capital Flows to All Developing countries, 1989-94
(US$ Billions)
cumulative
1989  1990  1991  1992  1993  1994P  1990-94P
Total net private flows  41.9  45.5  62.9  102.7  159.2  172.9  543.2
Private net debt flows  12.7  15.0  18.5  41.4  45.7  55.5  176.1
Commercial ban  0.8  0.1  3.9  12.8  -2.2
Bonds  5.3  3.4  12.5  12.9  42.1
Suppliers  1.1  7.3  -2.2  0.0  2.0
Other  5.5  4.2  4.3  15.7  3.8
Foreign direct investment  25.7  26.7  36.8  47.1  66.6  77.9  255.1
Portfolio equity investment  3.5  3.8  7.6  14.2  46.9  39.5  112.0
(estimated)
p=preliminary
Source: World Bank [1994].
2aTable 2. Comparison of Periods, Private Net Long-Term Capital Flows to All Developing Countries
Pre-Debt  Debt  Recent Surge
Crisis Period Crisis Period  Period
(1978-81)  (1982-89)  (1990-93)
Size of Inflows
Total, US$ billions, annual average  53.5  34.6  92.6
as %GNP  2.7  1.2  2.2
as % Exports  12.3  5.9  10.4
Asset composition of inflows (in percent)
Equity  18.1  41.0  67.7
Debt  81.9  59.0  32.3
Foreign direct investment  18.0  38.7  51.1
Portfolio equity flows  0.1  2.3  16.4
Portfolio debt flows  3.3  7.6  15.3
Other debt flows  78.7  51.4  17.3
To the private sector  38.3  40.7  84.6
To the public sector  61.7  59.3  15.4
Regional composition of inflows (in percent)
Sub-Saharan Africa  8.7  7.2  1.5
East Asia and Pacific  14.8  27.9  42.2
Latin American and the Caribbean  53.9  29.9  33.2
Middle East and North Africa  7.7  10.1  0.9
South Asia  1.3  8.1  3.6
Europe and Central Asia  13.6  16.8  18.5
Source: Fernandez-Arias  and Montiel  [19951.
2bincreases were recorded in 1992 and 1993; based on preliminary figures for 1994 ($170 billion,
prior to the Mexican crisis), the acceleration in private flows has clearly ended. 4
Whether  expressed  in  absolute terms  or  scaled  according to  host  countries'  GNP  or
exports, private flows over the 1990-94 period were much larger than those during the preceding
five (or eight) years when many of these countries (at least those in Latin America) had  little
access to voluntary international capital flows.  On the other hand,  recent flows are somewhat
smaller  (in  scaled  terms)  than those  which  occurred during  the  four  year  period  (1978-81)
immediately preceding the debt crisis.5  And even in the year (1993) when recent private flows
attained their  highest value (relative to  GNP),  they never financed as much  as 5  percent  of
domestic investment for developing countries as a group -- highlighting the dominant role played
still played in that regard by domestic saving.
Second, the composition of flows has changed dramatically from that prevailing during
the debt and pre-debt crisis periods in several respects; see Table 2.  As noted earlier, in the late
1970s and the 1980s it was debt flows, bank loans, and public-sector borrowers who dominated
private net capital flows.  In contrast, in the 1990s, it is non-debt-creating flows (foreign direct
investment and portfolio equity), bonds, and private-sector borrowers that have ruled the roost.
The fastest growing components have been bonds and  portfolio equity flows,  both  of which
increased more than tenfold since 1990.  Asset composition ratios are now almost the reverse
image of what they were in the late 1970s.
Third,  there remains considerable country and regional concentration in the destination
for private flows. The five largest recipients (in absolute amounts) of private capital inflows over
the 1990-94 period took approximately 60 percent of the total,  and the top 20 host countries,
over 80 percent.  High concentration also characterizes the components of the total.  China by
itself  was the  recipient  of  nearly  30  percent  of  all  foreign direct  investment  in  developing
countries in  1990-94, and  50 percent of the total was accounted for by only  five countries.
Similarly, on the order of 40-50 percent of total long-term bond flows and of portfolio equity
flows went to three or four countries.  By region, East Asia and the Pacific led the parade (42
percent  of total  flows), with  Latin America and  the Caribbean  (33 percent)  and  Europe  and
Central  Asia (18 percent) next in line (see Table 2).  For  comparison,  in the pre-debt crisis
period (1978-81), Latin America and the Caribbean got the more than half (54 percent) of the
total, while the other two together accounted for only a quarter.
Fourth, within the group of host countries, there have been enormous differences across
countries in the extent and  modalities of the net private  capital inflow.  In  terms of  absolute
Again, the preliminary 1994 figure should be treated with caution.
5  Fernandez-Arias and Montiel [1995].
3amounts, China and Mexico headed the list of recipients.  In per capita terms, the leaders were
Hungary and Malaysia.  Expressed relative to GNP,  Malaysia, China,  Thailand, Chile,  and
Mexico had  average  net  inflows  considerably larger  than those  for  Brazil,  Korea,  and  the
Philippines (World Bank [1995]).  By region (again expressed relative to GDP),  Asia and the
East Pacific have experienced larger inflows than Latin America and the Caribbean, or than any
other regional group.  Timing wise, Asian developing countries (most of whom never really lost
access during the debt crisis) experienced the surge in capital inflows first (late 1980s), followed
by Latin America (1990), and more recently by other regions; of particular note, the transition
economies  of  Central  and Eastern  Europe,  witnessed a  $21 billion  reversal  (from  deficit to
surplus) in their capital account position as between 1991 and 1993 (see Calvo, Sahay, and Vegh
[1994]).  Maturity strategies differed as well, with Mexico, for example, increasing its reliance
on short-term  flows, while China and Korea took  the opposite tack.6 By region,  short-term
flows were more important for host countries in the Middle East than for those elsewhere.
Accompanying developments
Interest also attaches to the macroeconomic developments in the host countries that have
accompanied such capital inflows.  I say "accompanied" because there has as yet been no attempt
in the literature to separate the independent influence of capital inflows on these developments
from the influence of "other" factors.  With that caveat in mind, several broad regularities are
worth noting.  To begin with, the normal case is for a significant share of the capital inflow to be
channeled into an increase in international reserves.  Fernandez-Arias and Montiel [1995], for
example, find that in half of the 12 countries experiencing the largest inflows relative to the size
of their economies, reserve accumulation accounted for about 40 percent of the inflow.  Calvo et
al [1993, 1994a, 1995] likewise document a similarly high propensity to accumulate international
reserves in their sample of Latin American and Asian host countries.
The increase in international reserves reflects in part the conscious policy decision in host
countries  n=t to  allow  the  classical  adjustment mechanism to  a  capital  inflow  to  operate
unimpeded, that is, authorities are not willing to be completely passive with respect to either an
appreciation of the nominal exchange rate or a monetization of the capital inflow.  Usually, and
particularly  at the beginning of  the  surge period,  host-country authorities engage heavily  in
sterilized exchange market intervention, that is, they first purchase foreign exchange and then act
to offset or  "sterilize" the effect on the money supply by selling domestic bonds or by increasing
(banks')  reserve  requirements.  If  the capital inflow  persists,  adjustment generally  becomes
harder to resist and we eventually observe some combination of appreciation of the real exchange
rate, an increase in monetary expansion, an increase in domestic absorption (that is, increases in
6  For host countries  as a group, there has  been no clear trend in the maturity  composition  of private  capital  flows.
Short-term  flows  represented  roughly  a quarter  of total flows in 1990-94  versus 13 and 40 percent  during  the 1982-
89 and 1978-81  periods,  respectively;  see Fernandez-Arias  and Montiel  [1995].
4consumption and investment spending) along with a decrease in domestic saving, and a widening
of the current account deficit.  Again, there are considerable differences across host countries in
each of these dimensions.  But the deterioration in the current account is almost always smaller
than the net capital inflow itself, so that international reserves increase.
Appreciation of the real exchange rate reflects appreciation of the nominal exchange rate
(under  a  free float or  crawling peg  cum exchange rate band)  and/or an  increase  in  the host
country's  relative  inflation  rate  (particularly  for  nontradable  goods)  spurred  on  by  the
monetary/spending  effects  of  the  capital  inflow.  Some  host  countries  (Argentina,  Mexico,
Colombia) experienced very large (15 percent or more) real appreciations (relative to the two
year period preceding the beginning of the inflows), while others (China, Malaysia, Costa Rica,
Korea,  Brazil,  Indonesia,  Venezuela)  either  recorded  real  exchange  rate  depreciations  or
accepted only small appreciations.  On the whole,  real exchange rate appreciation (both during
the surge period itself and relative to the pre-surge period) has been more widespread in Latin
American host countries than in Asian ones;  indeed, as a group,  high-inflow Asian countries
actually  recorded  a  depreciation  in  their  real  exchange rates  during  the  surge  period  (IMF
[1995]).  Not coincidentally, Asian host countries were generally better able to maintain strong
export performance during the surge period than were high-inflow countries in Latin America.
On  the  monetary  front,  while  the  large  majority  of  host  countries  experienced  an
increase in the growth of real money balances (Calvo et al [1995]) and a drop  in real interest
rates,  there is little indication of a generalized sharp acceleration of inflation during the surge
period.  The implementation of anti-inflationary monetary programs either before or during the
surge period (e.g.,  Bolivia, Chile, Mexico), relatively heavy reliance on sterilized intervention to
limit the monetary effects of the inflow (e.g., Chile, Colombia, Hong Kong, Korea, Mexico, the
Philippines),  appreciation  of  the  nominal  exchange  rate  in  some  quarters  (e.g.,  Chile  and
Mexico), and,  in a few cases (e.g.,  Indonesia and Thailand), tightened fiscal policy during the
surge period, seem to account for that outcome.  On the whole, Asian host countries sterilized
more of  the capital  inflow and were  more successful at keeping inflation under  firm control
during the surge period than were their Latin American counterparts.
An  upsurge  of  equity  pricea  was  another  common  phenomenon  in  host  countries,
particularly where portfolio equity flows represented a large share of the total capital inflow.
The  IFC's  composite  index of  stock prices  in  15 emerging  markets  exhibits a  strong trend
increase beginning in early 1991, and a dramatic acceleration in 1993 when these markets easily
outperformed  their  industrial-country  counterparts  (79  percent  average  return  for  the  IFC
composite  index versus  7.5  percent  for  the  U.S.  S&P 500  index). Equity  price  corrections
occurred in 1992 and in 1994.  Increases in real estate prices surfaced in many host countries as
well.
Increases in domestic absorption have been the norm  in host  countries.  Increases in
investment  were  particularly  large in Chile,  Venezuela, Thailand, Indonesia,  Colombia,  and
5Bolivia.  Increases in consumption were also widespread, and took up a relatively large share of
the increase in absorption in Argentina, Mexico, Turkey, Portugal, and Colombia.  By region,
the  increase  in  absorption  was  tilted  more  toward  investment in  Asian  high-capital  inflow
countries  than in  Latin  American  ones.  Decreases in  domestic  saying more  often than  not
accompanied increases in absorption, especially in Latin America. 7 Reflecting these absorption
and saving trends,  host countries typically experienced a  deterioration of their current  account
positions,  with  the  widening  of  current  account  deficits  being  more  pronounced  in  Latin
American host countries than in Asian ones.  In  1994, at least four host countries (Hungary,
Mexico, the Philippines, and Thailand) were running current account deficits equal to or greater
than 5 percent of GDP.
Finally,  most researchers detect a tendency for ecnomicgrowth  to  increase somewhat
during the surge period, although comparisons with the pre-surge period elicit mixed results
(depending on both the country composition of the capital inflow group and the time period used
to define the pre-surge period).8
Among those high-inflow countries experiencing strong increases in growth were China, India,
Argentina, Venezuela, Thailand, and Turkey; on the lower end  of that spectrum (in terms of
changes in  growth  rates),  were  the  Philippines, Portugal,  Malaysia,  Korea,  Bolivia,  Brazil,
Indonesia, and Chile.
III.  Causes and Sustainability
Policymakers cannot make decisions about how best  to deal with large capital inflows
without first coming to some view about what has driven these inflows in the past and about what
is likely to be driving these flows in the future.  Accordingly, much of the literature on capital
inflows has been directed at making such a diagnosis.  In this section, I first summarize the main
causal factors (low interest rates in creditor countries, policy performance in host countries, and
evolution in the operating environment), and then go to offer some remarks on sustainability.
Causal  factrs
According  to IMF [1995] figures, total saving  (as a percent of host country  GDP) over the 1990-94  period
increased  in high-inflow  Asian countries relative to its average value during 1983-89;  in contrast, total saving
decreased  in high-inflow  Latin  American  countries  over  the same  period.
Some  of the growth  effects  may be related  to the composition  of capital  inflows. In this connection,  Husain  and
Jun [1992] find that foreign  direct investment  flows had greater  effects on growth (in ASEAN and South Asian
developing  countries)  than did foreign  aid flows. Fry [1993]  investigates  the effect  of foreign  direct investment  flows
on investment,  saving,  and economic  growth in 16 host developing  countries. In brief, he finds that the effects  of
FDI flows  are more  positive  in five Pacific  Basin  economies  than  elsewhere  -- a result he attributes  to the lower level
of distortions  in the former.
6Topping the list of likely suspects is low interest rates and recession in major creditor
countries, with particular emphasis on the United States.9 Short-term (nominal) interest rates in
the United States fell from over 7 1/2 percent in 1990 to about 3 percent in 1993, as the Federal
Reserve eased monetary policy to spur recovery from the recession (recall that U.S.  real GDP
grew by only 1.2 percent in 1990 and declined by 0.6 percent in 1991) It was not until February
1994 that  U.S.  short-termn  rates began to  move in the other direction.  Taking the  industrial
countries as a group, the weighted aggregate short-term interest fell from over 9 percent in 1990
to  a  little over  5  percent  in  1993.10  Long-term  interest  rates  in  the  G-10 countries  show
somewhat  less  variation but  essentially followed the  same  trend,  declining  (on  a  weighted
average basis) from about 9 1/2 percent in 1990 to 6 1/2 percent in 1993.  Substituting real for
nominal interest rates, or interest rate spreads (between creditor and debtor countries) for interest
rate movements in  creditor countries alone,  or relative  stock market  performance for  rate of
return differentials on fixed-income assets, doesn't  alter the qualitative nature of the conclusion
(Calvo et al [1993]).
Lower  interest  rates  in  creditor  countries  should  induce  greater  capital  flows  to
developing countries through two channels." 1 First,  other things equal,  it makes investing at
home less attractive at the margin than investing abroad; this is the asset substitution channel.
Second,  it  improves the creditworthiness of  debtor  countries either  by  reducing  the  present
discounted value of their contractual debt payments (for example, where debt carries  floating
interest  rates)  and/or  (more importantly) by  increasing the  present  discounted  value  of  the
resources available for external payments;12  this is the creditworthiness channel.
Consistent with these a priori arguments, available empirical studies suggest that foreign
interest rates -- especially U.S.  interest rates -- are capable of explaining much of the surge in
capital  inflows  in  the  1990s.  The  pioneering  work of  Calvo et  al  [1993] established  that
international reserve accumulation and real exchange rate appreciation in Latin American host
countries were highly correlated with various U.S. financial variables.  Later studies (Chuhan et
al [1993], Fernandez-Arias [1994], Frankel [1994], Dooley et al [1994]), using data for a wider
9  Chuhan  et al [1993]  report that the United  States  was the source  of about half of bond flows and two-thirds  of
net equity  flows to Asian  and Latin  American  host countries  in 1992.
10  The evolution  of LIBOR  follows  the same  pattern.
1  Temporarily  low interest rates may also encourage  borrowers  to increase their issuance  of bonds to take
advantage  of better rates.
12  Over the 1990-93  period, only about 15-20  percent of bond issues by developing  countries  carried floating
interest  rates or convertible  terms;  that  percentage  jumped  to about  50 percent  in 1994  (see  World  Bank [1994]).
7sample of host countries on either net capital flows or secondary market prices  of bank debt,
found that foreign financial variables typically accounted for more than half (and sometimes as
much as 85 percent) of the capital inflow surge and three quarters or more of the variation in
secondary market prices.  Fernandez-Arias [1994] estimates that the asset substitution effect is
about twice as  large as  the creditworthiness effect,  while Chuhan et  al [1993] conclude that
"external" financial conditions were much more important for flows to Latin American than for
those to Asia.
A  second  suspect  is  policy performance  in  the  host  countries.  Because developing
countries  have  less  capital  than  industrial  ones,  there  is  a  presumption  that  the  marginal
productivity  of  capital  should  be  higher  in  the  former  than  in  the  latter.  Yet  poor
macroeconomic and structural policies can make the expected return on capital much less than
the  potential  return.  By  the  same token,  improvements in  those  policies  can  improve  the
expected risk/return outlook and attract greater inflows.
During  1991-93, 11 developing countries undertook full or extensive liberalizations of
their exchange controls on capital movements;  15 eased restrictions on portfolio inflows; 23
liberalized controls on foreign direct investment; and 5 eased or eliminated controls on portfolio
outflows  (IMF  [1994]).  Thus,  even  though  some  host  countries  (e.g.,  Chile)  eventually
intensified controls or reserve requirements on inflows to slow their pace, the trend on the whole
during the 1990s was one of capital account liberalization.  To the extent that restrictions acted
as a binding constraint on private inflows to some developing countries in the past, their easing
or removal loosened this constraint.  For example, while the growth of foreign direct investment
into China has multiple causes, the easing of restrictions played an important role, including the
1992 decision to allow foreign investment in all the major inland cities (Bell et al [1993]).13
The lure of improved creditworthiness -- induced in turn by better macroeconomic and
structural policy fundamentals in the host countries -- is surely another part of the picture.  By
now, there is an impressive array of country case studies and multi-country econometric evidence
to support that proposition that countries with better policy fundamentals find it easier to attract
and to  hold foreign and domestic saving -- as well as  to access that savings on better  terms
(spreads, maturities, offering prices, etc) -- than do countries with weaker policy fundamentals.
Empirical studies of capital flight from developing countries (Dooley [1988], Mathieson
and Rojas-Suarez [1993]) typically find  that capital flight is much larger when the home country
has a  large  budget deficit and  when its  real exchange rate  is  highly overvalued.  Similarly,
studies (Edwards [1991b]) that have examined the destination of foreign direct investment flows
indicate that countries with better policy fundamentals generally get larger shares of the total.  So
too  with  studies  of  the country  pattern  of  bond  flows in  the  recent  inflow  episode,  where
13  The big surge in foreign direct investment in China took place in 1993 when it hit almost $26 billion.
8researchers  (Chuhan  et  al  [1993]) document  that these  flows  are  related,  inter  alia,  to  the
borrowing  country's  credit  ranking.  What we know about the time-series and  cross-country
behavior of secondary market prices of bank debt (Dooley and Stone [1993]) and of interest rate
spreads  on  developing-country bond  issues (Cline  [1995],  Goldstein et  al  [1994],  Edwards
[19861)  tell a similar story:  differences in policy fundamentals get reflected in the terms that the
market sets for different borrowers, as well as for the same borrower over time.  In  1993, for
example, certain Asian sovereign borrowers (China, Korea, and Thailand) paid a spread on their
bonds of less than 100 basis points over comparable U.S.  Treasuries, whereas the private sector
in Latin America typically paid a spread of 300-500 basis points  on its borrowing.  In  1989,
Mexican  sovereign  bonds  paid  a  spread  of  roughly  800  basis  points;  after  intervening
improvements in its policies, that spread was reduced to about 200 basis points in 1993.
Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Mexico, Thailand, and Venezuela among other host
countries,  achieved sizeable turnarounds in their fiscal positions (relative to GDP) prior  to the
surge  in  capital  inflows  (Cline  [1995],  IMF  [1994],  Schadler et  al  [1993]).  Mexico,  for
example, moved from a primary fiscal deficit of 8 percent of GDP in 1981 to a primary surplus
of 8 percent in 1988-89.  Similarly, between 1983 and 1989, Argentina's primary fiscal position
strengthened by  10 percentages points of GDP.  Thailand improved its overall  fiscal position
substantially both before the surge period and during it.  On the whole, more was achieved on
fiscal policy discipline up to  1989 then thereafter (Dooley et al [1994]).  In some cases (Chile,
Colombia, Egypt, Thailand), fiscal adjustment cum nominal depreciation improved the domestic
cost structure (Schadler et al [1993]) -- often correcting substantially overvalued real exchange
rates that were  a legacy of the early  1980s.  Priatization  programs  (in Argentina, Chile,  the
Czech  Republic,  Hungary,  Mexico,  Indonesia, Malaysia,  and  the Philippines)  both  offered
foreign investors an opportunity to gain a stake in some of the host country's  best  firms (the
crown jewels) and reduced the prospect of future large calls on the budget (in the case of less
efficient firms).  Aggregate private-to-private capital flows, which represented about 45 percent
of total net private (long-term) capital flows in 1990, took 70 percent of the total by 1993.  Trade
liberalizatimn increased  competitive pressures  for  greater  efficiency  in  home  markets  and
improved  export prospects.  Colombia,  for  example, eliminated most  nontariff  barriers  and
reduced its average import tariff from over 40 percent at the end of 1989 to less than 12 percent
in March 1992 (Corbo and Hernandez [1993]).
Inflation  performance  was  mixed.  Bolivia,  Chile,  and  Mexico  implemented major
disinflation programs prior to the surge in capital inflows but most Latin American host countries
did  not record  markedly  lower inflation rates until the early  1990s (when Argentina,  Brazil,
Ecuador, and Peru each launched inflation stabilization programs).  The inflation performance of
high-inflow Asian countries didn't change much (the group average was in the 7-8 percent range
throughout most of the 1977-93 period).
As  country policies improved so too did their credit  ratings.  By  1990, at least eight
developing countries had established an investment-grade credit rating from one of the two major
9international credit-rating agencies (Moody's and Standard and Poors).  By 1994, that figure had
risen  to  eleven,  and about a  dozen more developing countries had a  credit  rating just  below
investment grade (World Bank [1994]).  Higher credit ratings, in turn,  seem to have broadened
the  investor base for  developing-country securities,  by drawing  in  certain more  conservative
institutional investors (pension funds, life insurance companies, and some mutual funds) whose
charters and attitude toward risk had precluded participation before that. Initially, the surge of
capital inflows represented mainly the return of flight capital by wealthy individual investors but
in 1992-93, U.S. mutual funds and U.S. pension funds apparently began to take part in a serious
way (Goldstein et al [19941).
To  say that  better  policies  in  host  countries typically  attracts greater  private  capital
inflows and better  borrowing  terms than weaker policies is one  thing.  To  assert  that better
policies are a  sine qua  non for large inflows is quite another.  In fact, there are many recent
examples -- from both industrial and developing-country experience -- where large-scale capital
flows have occurred in the absence of greatly improved policies.  When host-country interest
rates are high, market participants may reckon that they can earn an attractive rate of return even
in the face of weak fundamentals -- so long as they can quickly undo that position before the
inevitable market correction occurs.  They may also figure than once the cumulative capital flow
becomes large, the probability of government intervention during  any sharp correction of asset
prices will limit the potential downside risk.
The large capital inflow into the United States in the first half of the 1980s (in the face of
a widening fiscal deficit and an increasingly overvalued real exchange rate), and the large inflow
into the higher interest rate ERM currencies in the 1989-91 period (in the face of deteriorating
competitive positions and still weak fiscal situations in the host countries), are but two industrial-
country cases in point.  No surprise then, that the recent surge into developing countries has had
its share of these flows too.
For example, Brazil, India, and Turkey each attracted sizeable inflows before they had
made much progress toward fiscal sustainability (IMF [1994]).  A mix of loose fiscal policy and
tight monetary policy will typically produce high interest rates.  Even though uncovered interest
rate parity  suggests that a  positive interest rate  differential should be  counterbalanced by  an
offsetting expected depreciation of the (high interest rate) currency,  some market  participants
may nevertheless gamble that actual exchange rate developments will differ from the market's
current expectation.  14
14  This has often proved to be a profitable gamble.  Frankel and Rose [1995] document that for floating exchange
rates of industrial countries, the tendency has been for the high-interest currency to appreciate -- exactly counter to
the prediction of uncovered interest rate parity; this is often referred to as the "forward discount puzzle."
10Another inducement to inflows is garden-variety tih  credit policies.  Recall that a main
message of the monetary approach to the balance of payments is that, for an open economy with
a fixed exchange rate,  the balance of payments is the channel by which an excess demand for
money is satisfied; an open capital account can be the main avenue for that monetary inflow.
For some host countries, a tightening of credit policies seems to have preceded the capital inflow
surge (Schadler et al [1993]).  Yet another possibility, relevant to the 1992-93 surge, is that some
investors with a relatively high tolerance for risk may simply have invested in some countries
who had not yet undertaken significant policy reform under the expectation that they soon would.
After  all,  foreign investors who got  in early  in the  Argentinian, Mexican,  and  Thai  equity
markets made very  large gains in  1989, as did holders of Argentinian, Chilean, Mexican,  and
Venezuelan securitized bank debt in 1991.  Those who missed that boat may have been eager not
to miss the next one, and may have reasoned that the "demonstration effect" of earlier successful
reform efforts would spread throughout Latin America.
A third class of causal factors falls under the broad heading of evolution in the operating
environment for developing-country capital flows.  It has three main elements.
Element number one is debt restructring,  particularly for Latin American host countries.
Over the past five years, roughly 85 percent of the end-1989 stock of commercial bank debt of
middle-income countries has been restructured in the context of officially-supported "Brady-type"
initiatives.  If one takes into account the official funds borrowed under the Brady plan to finance
debt and debt-service reduction operations, the effective reduction in total net external debt was
probably on the order of 15 percent (Cline [1995], Dooley et al [1994]).  As noted in Figure  1,
debt indicators  for  the Baker  17 indebted countries continued  to  improve  over  the  1989-93
period, as did secondary market prices of bank debt (at least until early 1994).  What is less clear
is how much of those improvements can be  attributed to debt reduction versus the decline in
international interest rates.  Cline [1995] argues that the Brady plan had beneficial effects larger
than  those  implied by  the  amount  of  effective  debt  reduction  since  it  sent  a  signal  about
decreasing government support for the banks versus debtors, since it had the beneficial political
effect of  replacing a  willing-to-pay constraint with  a  less binding ability-to-pay constraint  in
debtor countries,  and since it boosted confidence more generally.  He also notes  a consistent
tendency for the secondary market price of country's  bank debt to rise appreciably right around
its signing of a Brady deal.  Dooley et al [1994] attribute some positive role for debt reduction
but  find  in  their  regression results  (for secondary market prices  of bank debt) that  the most
powerful  explanation  for  time  series  behavior  is  the  level  of  international interest  rates.
Nevertheless, there is no dispute with the proposition that net capital flows to Latin  American
host  countries  would  have  been  smaller  in  1990-94  if  there  hadn't  been  as  much  debt
restructuring along the way.
The growing maturity of the market for developing-country securities is a second element
in the evolving operating environment.  The range of instruments has expanded,  liquidity has
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Ilaincreased,' 5 and restrictions  imposed  by major creditor  countries  on developing-country  issuers
have been  eased. 16
As representative  of this growing maturity, consider the instruments  available  to a U.S.
investor who wishes to purchase developing-country  equities.  He/she might be attracted to
depository  receipts (known  as American  or General  Depository  Receipts). These are negotiable
certificates  issued  by a U.S. bank that are fully backed  by shares  which in turn represent  claims
on the publicly traded debt or equity securities  of a company. From the investor's viewpoint,
they carry several advantages:  they are denominated  and pay interest or dividends in U.S.
dollars; settlement  occurs in 5-6 days in the United  States;  tax payments  on the underlying asset
are often simplified;  and the investor avoids global custodian  safekeeping  charges.  There are
also different  types of depository  receipts  that differ in their degree of disclosure. The number
of depository  receipts  currently  trading is thought  to be about  900.
Alternatively,  this investor  might prefer a country fund -- a mutual  fund that invests in a
wide spectrum  of emerging  markets,  or in ones from a particular  region, or that specializes  in a
single country.  Country funds offer relatively low minimum  investment,  more liquidity than
investing  in the local market, and a relatively  low cost method of diversifying  across emerging
markets.1 7 The first country fund -- the Mexico  Fund -- was launched  in 1981. There are now
approximately  500 country  funds listed in a number  of financial  centers. The combined  portfolio
of all emerging-market,  closed-end  mutual  funds  was about $33  billion at end-1993.
Yet another choice would be to purchase directly the equity of individual  companies.
Assume the interest was in Chinese companies. The investor might then consider "B" shares
(equity shares denominated in  foreign currency and reserved for foreigners) listed on  the
Shanghai  or Shenzhen  stock exchanges,  or shares of the (7) most internationally  well-known
Chinese enterprises (e.g.,  Tsingtao Brewery) listed on  the Stock Exchange of Hong Kong
1  According  to the Emerging  Markets  Traders  Association,  total  trading volumes  in the secondary  market  for
developing-country  instruments  exceeded  $790  billion  in 1992;  it is believed  that trading  volume  in 1993  exceeded  $1
trillion  (Goldstein  et aL  [19941).
16  The U.S. Securities  and Exchange  Commission  adopted  Rule 144a  in 1990. It permits  holders of shares in
non-U.S. firms purchased  in private placement  to sell them freely to qualified  institutional  buyers under certain
conditions  without  being subject  to a two-year  minimum  holding  period. Japan  lowered in 1993  the minimum  credit
rating  for issuing  bonds in the Samurai  market  (and its minimum  rating requirement  is expected  to be abolished  in
January 1996)  and, effective  as of January 1995, the Tokyo Stock  Exchange  reduced  the listing  requirements  for
developing-country  companies.  In the last few years, several industrial  countries have also made it easier for
developing  countries with earlier debt-servicing  difficulties  to  "graduate" from commercial bank provisioning
requirements.
Diwan et al [1992] argue that country  funds traded in the capital markets of industrial  countries can help
promote  the efficiency  of pricing  in the emerging  capital  markets  and can enhance  capital  mobilization  by local firms.
12(SEHK).  The value of equity (both A and B shares) on the two Chinese exchanges was about
$40 billion at end-1993, while Chinese equity placements on the SEHK in that year amounted to
over $1 billion.
Or suppose that the investor wants an option -- either as an alternative to purchasing the
underlying instrument or as hedge.  Mexico's  Telmex is now the second most actively traded
listed equity option in the United States, and U.S.  listed equity options are available for  some
Argentinian,  Brazilian,  and  Chilean companies  as  well.  Trading  volumes  (in  the  over-the-
counter market)  for developing-country debt derivatives almost quadrupled between  1992 and
1993, and bid-offer spreads on options declined by half (World Bank [1994]).
All of this, along with improving accounting and disclosure standards (in host countries)
and greater availability of market research on emerging markets, has made foreign investors less
reluctant than they used to be to send capital to developing countries when the opportunities are
viewed as favorable.
The third element of the evolving operating environment is the globalization of business.
Production,  sourcing,  and marketing decisions are increasingly made on a worldwide basis.
Total sales of multinational finms are now larger (by about a third) than world exports of goods
and non-factor services.  While the rate and extent of globalization has slowed over the past five
years  -- after experiencing a spectacular rise  in the  1980s (Graham [1995]), flows of foreign
direct investment to developing countries have actually accelerated during the 1990s.  Whereas
developing-countries accounted for 23 percent of global foreign direct investment inflows in the
mid-1980s,  that share had risen  to about 40 percent by  1992-94 (World Bank [1995]).18  As
noted earlier, a handful of the faster-growing developing countries -- China, Mexico, Brazil, the
four  Asian tigers,  and  several other ASEAN nations -- have gotten the lion's  share  of  those
flows.  The advantages that these host countries offer in terms of labor cost,  rapidly growing
domestic  markets,  and  increasingly hospitable trade and  investment regimes,  have apparently
been decisive in making them the preferred habitat for recent FDI flows.19
To  sum up,  the surge of private capital flows to developing countries in the 1990s has
multiple causes.  The fall in industrial-country interest rates was probably the most important
The World Bank [1995]  projects  that the developing-country  share of FDI inflows  could reach 48 percent by
the year 2010.
19  Jun et al 11993]  analyze  the trends and determinants  in Japanese  foreign direct investment  outflows. They
show that the East Asian  economies  were first used as low-wage  production  bases, with a shift in the 1980s  away
from the NIEs toward  the ASEAN-4  and most recently,  China.  Due to increasing  labor costs, the NIEs lost their
advantage  as production  bases but still attracted  Japanese  investors  attempting  to establish  a foothold  in these new
rapidly expanding  consumer markets; see also Khan and Reinhart [1995] on  the relocation of labor-intensive
industries  within  Asia.
13driving  force  but  policy  performance  in  host  countries  along  with  certain  changes  in  the
operating environment also figured prominently in the outcome.
One potential contributory factor to surges in developing country capital flows -- be they
positive or negative surges -- that is not well understood is contagion.  By contagion, I mean a
process by which changes in market assessments for some borrowers lead to sequential changes
in assessments (in the same direction) for other borrowers, above that implied by the latter's  true
creditworthiness.  Positive contagion is often mentioned as a factor enlarging net private flows to
developing countries in  1992-93, just  as negative contagion was mentioned as contributing to
asset price declines and reversals of capital flows for many developing countries in the weeks
surrounding the recent Mexican crisis.
The trick here of course is to figure out how financial developments in the first country
affect the true creditworthiness of other countries.  For example, if country B is an  important
trading partner of country A, then a crisis in A which requires it to cut expenditure and imports
will reduce B's exports to A and B's true creditworthiness.  On the above definition, this would
not be contagion even if asset prices and capital flows to B showed sympathetic movements with
those in A.  But what if losses sustained on loans to A forced (their common) creditors to also
sell their holdings in B's assets -- even though A and B had little trade or financial business with
each other?  Or,  as  hinted at earlier,  suppose policy reform in  A led market participants to
believe that policy reform in B was more likely in the future -- even if authorities in B were not
so inclined.
The notion of contagion likewise raises questions about creditors access to information,
particularly  in  the short  term.  In  the immediacy of a  crisis  in  A,  creditors  may not  know
whether B or C's  true creditworthiness is affected by the shock.  Until they find out, they may
"run to quality" by selling the assets of both B and C (especially if transaction costs are low). In
fact, a common feature of financial crises is for spreads between high and low-quality assets to
widen  (Mishkin [1994]).  We  also know  that correlation  of  equity price  movements  across
countries  is  greater  during  times  of  turbulence than in  normal times  (Goldstein and  Mussa
[1994]).  This  could be  quite rational behavior  on the part  of  creditors.  Is  it  "contagion"
nevertheless?  If contagion reflects a matter of information, why has contagion after the Mexican
crisis  been  greater  for  equities  than  for  interest  rates  or  exchange  rates?  What  kind  of
information  that  is  not  now published  about  developing  countries'  economic  situation  and
prospects would stand the best chance of reducing contagion?
While  many of  these questions have been taken  up  in  the theoretical  literature  (on
asymmetric information) or in literature on financial crises in industrial countries, there have as
yet been few applications to the developing-country capital flow context.  It is a worthy subject
for future research.
Sustainability
14More challenging  than explaining  why private capital inflows were so large in the first
half of this decade is the task of speculating  on how large such inflows are likely to be in the
second  half. Would  an annual  private  net inflow  to developing  countries  of say, $125-150  billion
be sustainable?  If not, why  not? In seeking  to answer  that question,  three sets of considerations
deserve  emphasis.
First, there is the cyclical,  interest rate effect. With interest  rates, what comes down can
go back up.  Since early February 1994, the Federal Reserve  has increased  interest rates seven
times, in an effort to prevent growth  in the real economy  from getting  so far ahead of potential  as
to reignite inflationary  pressures.  At the time of writing, U.S. short term rates stand at a little
over 6 percent, versus a little over 4 percent a year ago.  According  to the futures market, the
expectation  is that U.S. short-term  rates will stay about where they are through March of next
year.  Fernandez-Arias  and Montiel  [1995]  also read the futures markets  as suggesting  that long-
term government  bond yields will remain reasonably  high over the next five years.  This means
that the asset substitution  and creditworthiness  effects  discussed  earlier have switched sign.  The
implication  is that interest rate effects  should reduce the demand for developing-country  assets
over the medium  term relative  to what it was over the average  of the past three or four years.
While preliminary  figures suggest  that the absolute  amount  of net private capital  flows to
developing  countries  was perhaps  slightly  larger in 1994  than in 1993, the acceleration  of flows
that was evident in 1991-93  has already  ended. It seems  more than coincidence  that last year the
(IFC) index of emerging  equity  market  prices fell; that  issuance  of bonds by developing  countries
also declined, along with a widening of spreads, a  shortening  of average maturities, and a
decrease  in average  size of issues;  and that secondary  market prices of Brady  bonds also dipped.
Second, there is the stock adjustment  effect in investors' portfolios.  Economic  theory
tells us  that the  rearranging of asset shares in  response to  a new pattern of  interest rate
differentials  is a finite process.  Cumulative  changes in stocks of assets diminish  the need for
further  flows.
Suppose, for example,  that prior to the fall in industrial-country  interest rates, industrial-
country investors  held 98 percent of their portfolio  in industrial-country  assets and 2 percent in
emerging  market assets. Suppose  further  that a fall in interest rates on industrial-country  assets
increases  the optimal share of emerging  market assets from 2 percent to 4 percent.  While this
adjustment  is going on, net capital  flows to emerging  markets  will be increasing  markedly. But
once the emerging market share reaches 4 percent, the adjustment  process will cease (in the
absence of further changes in expected risk/returns).  From that point on, the investor will
acquire emerging  market assets only equal to 4 percent of the growth of his total portfolio. The
point here, as emphasized  by Fernandez-Arias  and Montiel [1995]  and Cline [1995], is that even
if interest rates in industrial  countries  had not reversed course in 1994, net private capital flows
15to developing  countries  would  have been expected  to taper-off. 20 Symmetrically,  an increase  in
industrial-country  interest rates may lead initially to sizeable declines in net capital flows to
developing  countries  as investors  rearrange  portfolio  shares -- but that decline  too should taper-
off as actual shares  approach equilibrium  ones.
Third and most intriguing,  there are longer-term  influences  at work that should  act to put
net private capital flows to developing-countries  on an upward trend over the medium  to long-
term.
While international  diversification  has been increasing  over the past decade, the share of
foreign assets, and particularly the share of developing-country  assets, in  industrial-country
portfolios  is still quite low.21 U.S. investors  hold about 95 percent of their equity holdings  in
the form of U.S. securities;  for Japan, Germany, and the United  Kingdom,  the corresponding
percentages  each exceed 85 percent (Tesar and Werner [1992]). The 300 largest  pension funds
in the world hold have about 7 percent of their portfolios  invested  outside the country.  U.S.
mutual funds, for example, are reported to have held at end-1993  about 2 percent of their assets
in emerging markets, mostly in equity; the emerging market shares of U.S. pension and life
insurance  companies  are thought  to be similar,  if not lower (Goldstein  et al [1994]).
Because  developing-country  financial  returns have tended to be higher on average than
industrial  ones and because these returns have in the past been weakly  correlated with those in
industrial  countries,  analysts  are united  (whatever  the method  of estimating  optimal  portfolios)  in
concluding  that industrial-country  investors  are considerably  "underweight"  in their holdings  of
developing-country  securities.  For example, Divecha et al [1992] conclude that industrial-
country investors  who placed 20 percent of their portfolio in an emerging market index fund
would have increased their return by 2 percent, while reducing  overall portfolio risk by 1 1/2
percent.  Similarly, with a market capitalization  (in 1993) of about $1 trillion, the emerging
market share  of a global  value-weighted  equity  portfolio  would  be about 12 percent.
Optimism is based on the presumption  that over time this "home bias" in industrial-
country portfolios  will decline  (because  of greater familiarity  with developing-country  markets,
lower transactions costs, and  an easing of  externally-imposed  prudential requirements on
Cline [1995] adopts this stock adjustment  assumption  to argue that repatriation  of capital flight to host
developing  countries  would  be on a declining  path  from 1992  through  1996.
21  One rough measure of international  diversification  of portfolios is provided by the ratio of cumulative
international  capital flows relative to new issues of all domestic  assets.  Averaging  inflows and outflows  for 12
OECD  countries,  this ratio increased  from 12 percent  in 1975-82  to almost 17 percent  in 1983-90;  see Goldstein  and
Mussa [19941. As for emerging  markets, a recent survey of institutional  fund managers (Kleinman  International
Consultants  [1993])  reported  that these managers  allocated  13 percent of their international  portfolios  to emerging
markets  assets,  up from 10 percent  in 1992  and 2.5 percent  in 1989.
16institutional investors), with large positive effects on net capital flows to developing countries.
To be sure,  the portfolios of institutional investors are huge.  It has been estimated that assets
under management by the most important institutional investors (pension funds, mutual funds,
insurance companies, etc) in the G-7 countries stood at about $13 trillion in  1993, with U.S.
institutional investors accounting for roughly two-thirds of the total (Ito et al  [1995]).  If the
emerging market share in this aggregate $13 trillion institutional portfolio say, doubled (from its
present share of 1 percent to 2 percent), this would represent an addition of about $130 billion.
In addition to the portfolio underweighting argument, others have argued for an upward
secular trend  in net private  capital flows based  on:  fast-growing developing-countries as  the
most likely source of  "supranormal" returns for aggressive portfolio managers bent on beating
their performance "bogey"  ;22 the increasing weight of developing-countries in world output and
trade,  along with the projection that their share will rise further over the medium term; 23 the
boost that the recent round of regional trade liberalizations (NAFTA, APEC, FTAA) will give to
developing-country exports and economic growth; the importance (now 40 percent of total flows)
and structural (irreversible) nature of foreign direct investment in developing countries; and the
lower vulnerability of host countries (after fiscal reform and a decline in debt ratios) to higher
international interest rates.
Several  authors  have gone  farther  on the  sustainability question by  conducting  some
simulation exercises.
Fernandez-Arias  and  Montiel  [1995],  for  example,  construct  an  index  of
creditworthiness based on the ratio of the existing stock of foreign liabilities to the present value
of capacity to pay (proxied in turn by exports plus imports).  They find: that creditworthiness
improved in host developing countries between 1990 and  1993; that (based on market  interest
rate  forecasts  and  growth  of  trade  at  its  historic  rate)  creditworthiness  declines  over  the
projection period (1995-2000) -- but not so severely as to constrain inflows in the near term; and
that conclusions on sustainability are very sensitive to relatively small changes in the assumptions
about the future path of interest rates or about the growth of exports plus imports.  Based on
stock adjustment arguments and market forecasts of increases in international interest rates, they
expect net flows to developing countries to decline from 1994 levels over the medium term.
Cline [1995] and Dooley et al [1994] consider whether a return of international interest
rates to pre-1990 levels would invoke a second debt crisis.  In brief, Cline [1995] answers that
question in the  negative, pointing to  intervening policy reform in  host countries  and to  now
22  See Wadhwani  and Shah [1994].
23  Both the IMF [1995]  and the World Bank [1995]  project  growth  rates for developing  countries  over the next
five to ten years that are almost  double  those  for industrial  countries.
17improved debt and debt-service positions (that makes debtors less vulnerable to an increase in
international interest  rates).  He  does  not  view  secondary market  prices  of debt  as  a  good
predictor  of market  access of developing countries.  As noted earlier, Dooley et al [1994] are
more pessimnistic. They argue that the change in the primary fiscal surplus for the "average"
middle-income debtor country has been negative since 1989, that secondary market prices are a
better barometer of debtor-country financial strength than is the volume of private net capital
flows, and that almost all of the improvement in secondary market debt prices since 1989 can be
accounted for by the decline in international interest rates.  As such, they conclude that a return
to pre-1990 international interest rates would depress secondary market debt prices to  a level
inconsistent with continued, private net capital inflows.
A  related  important  question  is  what  would  happen  to  developing-country  growth
performance if net private capital inflows did in fact decline sharply from their 1990-94 average.
A recent IMF  [1994] simulation exercise addresses that question.  It assumes that net capital
inflows decline by $60 billion (per year) over the 1995-99 period and that the reduced inflow is
apportioned across countries on  the basis of their  shares in total  inflows during  the 1990-93
period.  The reduced capital inflow is presumed to reflect policy slippages in the developing
countries,  in  the  form  of  higher  fiscal deficits  to  the  tune of  2  percent  of  GDP.  In  this
pessimistic scenario,  the external environment also worsens,  as summarized by lower growth,
higher inflation, and higher interest rates in industrial countries.  The bottom line is that real
output in the developing countries is almost 3 percent below  baseline in the third year of the
simulations, most of which would not be recouped by 1999.  The largest output decline occurs in
Asia, reflecting its large share in the assumed reduction of net capital inflows.
To  sum up,  there  are two main question marks  about sustainability of private  capital
flows over the medium term.
One  is  what  will happen to  international interest rates.  In  the near  term,  the main
uncertainty  is how  long lived will be  the recent softening of  activity in the largest industrial
economies and what will be the monetary policy response to it.  In the space of just the last three
months, market participants have lowered their forecast of year-end U.S. short-term interest rates
by about 125 basis points and a small cut in U.S. interest rates can no longer be ruled out.  The
international interest  rate  outlook over  say,  an  eighteen month horizon remains  particularly
uncertain at present. 24 Looking farther down the road  (5-15 years),  the biggest unknown is
whether industrial-country efforts to reduce public dissaving will be successful. 25 If they are,
24  The IMF's  May  1995 World Economic Outlook projected a  small increase in short-term interest rates as
between 1995 and 1996 in each of the three largest industrial countries (LIBOR was likewise projected to rise from
6.8  percent  in  1995 to 7  percent  in  1996), but  that projection was  made prior  to  the  most  recent  economic
developments in those countries.
2Note that budget deficits of the industrial countries averaged over $600 billion per year in 1991-93.
18analyses by the IMF [1995] and the World Bank [1995] suggest that global investment demands
could be accommodated at existing or somewhat lower (100-200 basis points lower) global real
interest rates;  alternatively, if those fiscal consolidation efforts are not  successful, then higher
(100-150 basis points higher) global real interest rates emerge as the most likely scenario.
The  second  question  mark  is  how  fast  the  large  "home  bias"  in  industrial-country
portfolios  will  be  reduced.  At  present,  the  share  of  emerging  markets  in  portfolios  of
institutional investors is so much below the level suggested by optimal portfolio considerations
that a doubling or even quadrupling of that share over the next decade cannot be dismissed out of
hand -- especially if host countries maintain good policy performance and relatively high growth
rates.  But that assumes that home bias primarily reflects unfamiliarity with these markets and
institutions.  If instead home bias  represents a  fear by these investors that non-residents will
receive  less  favorable  treatment  than  residents at  times of  acute  economic  difficulties (say,
because they obtain crucial information later or get taxed more heavily in case of full or partial
default), then they will avoid cumulative large, n= exposure to emerging markets risk.26 Only
time will tell which of those explanations of home bias is closest to the mark.
For now,  the most  defensible forecast is that private net capital inflows to developing
countries will decline for the next year to two from their 1993-94 average.  Over the medium-
term and extending out say, ten years,  net private flows should be on an healthy upward trend,
albeit one probably marked by considerable short-term volatility.
6  For arguments  as to why actual  international  capital  mobility  is much lower  than potential  capital  mobility,  see
Dooley  et al [1987].
19IV.  Policy Concerns and Options
So much  for background.  The central  issue is how  should economic policy  in  host
countries be  managed in the face of large,  net capital inflow.  After reviewing the traditional
benefits  of  capital  market  integration  and  capital  inflows,  I  turn  to  exchange  rate  policy,
sterilization policy,  fiscal policy, regulatory and supervisory policy, and efforts to  stem capital
inflows themselves via controls or tax measures.
The benefits of integration and capital inflows
Before discussing how to  cope with too much of a good thing, one ought  to be  clear
about  what  the  "good  thing"  is.  International  capital  markets,  just  like  their  domestic
counterparts, serve many functions.  They channel resources from units (in this case, countries)
that are savers to units that are dissavers, thus loosening the constraints imposed by self finance.
This permits  host countries to  smooth consumption or  to  undertake investment to  a greater
extent than  if  foreign  savings were  not  available,  thereby potentially increasing  welfare  and
economic growth.  By increasing competition, these capital markets raise the rate of return to
domestic savers and lower the cost of capital to domestic firms.  They provide liquidity.  They
transfer beneficial technology (through foreign direct investment).  They allocate and diversify
risk.  Finally, they can discipline errant government policies by subjecting the country initially to
a rising default premium and ultimately to credit rationing, or to a forced adjustment in exchange
rates.  All  this taken together is the "good thing" mentioned in the title of this paper and the
reason  why  there  has been  a clear  trend over  the past  three  decades in  both  industrial  and
developing countries alike toward deregulation of international capital flows.
But none  of this  contradicts the notion that host countries can borrow too  much from
abroad, or  that they can use foreign saving unproductively, or that large capital inflows (even
when they are non-debt creating) can threaten macroeconomic stability and  efficient resource
allocation and confront authorities with difficult policy choices.  Put in other words, a good final
outcome is not guaranteed.
In what follows, the pros and cons of alternative policy responses to large capital inflows
are identified and discussed.
Exchange rate policy
How countries conduct exchange rate policy in the face of large capital inflows depends
in  large part on  their choice  of exchange rate regime  -- a  choice that is invariably based on
broader  and  longer-term  considerations  than  the  capital  inflow  issue.  Managed  floating,
exchange rate bands (usually with a crawling peg), and fixed exchange rates (including currency
boards) each have their representatives in the sample of host countries.
20Whatever the exchange rate regime, the first  question the host country needs to  ask is
whether  the  equilibrium  real  exchange  rate  has  changed  in  the  way  that  would  make  real
appreciation desirable.  For example, if a country's  external debt and debt-service position has
improved markedly so that it no longer needs to generate such a large current account surplus to
meet debt payments, then a higher real exchange rate would be consistent with fundamentals.
Similarly,  if  the  host  country  has  undergone  rapid  productivity  growth  and  improved  its
underlying competitive position, a real  appreciation would be  warranted.  So too  if the  host
country's profitability has improved and it can be reasonably sure that the large capital inflow is
likely to be  sustainable.  On the other side, a large negative change in the terms of trade that
looks permanent would merit a lower real equilibrium exchange rate.  None of these factors is
academic for our group of host countries.  As noted earlier, many have experienced a reduction
in their debt-servicing burdens, some have been the beneficiaries of rapid productivity growth in
the  1980s, and  some have implemented structural  reforms that  have improved the long-term
outlook for profitability.  Also,  some host countries suffered a deterioration  in their terms of
trade during the 1990-93 period.
Let's  suppose however that the country does not believe the equilibrium real exchange
rate has changed since the pre-surge period.  In that case, it will be concerned about a large real
appreciation; how  concerned  it is depends  on  its  circumstances.  For  example,  highly open
economies  may  see  the  export  sector  as  crucial  to  economic  growth  and  technological
advancement.  Highly indebted ones will be particularly needing of export earnings to service
external debt.  And countries who have just recently implemented a trade reform will worry that
a significant fall in profitability of the traded goods sector -- coming soon after a reduction in
quotas  and  tariff  rates  -- could jeopardize  the credibility  of that  reform.  What  then  are  the
options?
If the host country follows a regime of (lightly) managed floating and allows the nominal
exchange  rate  to  take  the  brunt  of  the  adjustment,  it  will  protect  its  monetary  policy
independence (including its flexibility to act as lender of last resort when need be).  It will suffer
a real appreciation but  it will not experience an increase in inflation.  In fact, the effect of a
nominal depreciation is likely to be contractionary.  If the economy is already overheated, such a
deflatioliary impulse may be helpful.  By minimizing the impact of capital inflows on the external
component  of  high-powered  money,  it  can  worry  less  that  capital  inflows  will  exacerbate
problems in the banking system by increasing intermediated flows.  And nominal appreciation
may discourage further inflows because market participants will be unsure about the direction of
future exchange rate changes.
On the negative side of the ledger, it is well established that floating rate regimes exhibit
higher short-run  variability  of real  exchange  rates than do  more  fixed rate  regimes  (Mussa
[1990]); this,  in turn,  could adversely affect export performance, particularly if exporters find
hedging instruments too expensive or unfamiliar.  One also cannot rule out the possibility of
21bandwagon effects in the exchange market,  which might make the nominal appreciation larger
than the  authorities expected it to  be.  And start up  and  bankruptcy  costs could  mean that
declines in export industries will not be fully reversible when foreign capital and the exchange
rate change direction.
Malaysia provides  an example of a  country that has maintained  a policy of  managed
floating before and during  the surge in capital inflows.  The Central Bank intervenes only to
avoid excessive variability of the ringgit against a basket of foreign currencies.  By implementing
strong fiscal adjustment and tight monetary policy, Malaysia was able to keep both the rise in
inflation and the appreciation of the real exchange rate within relatively narrow limits (Corbo and
Hemandez [1993]).
This  is not to say that managed floating provides complete independence for monetary
policy in the context of large capital inflows.  An interesting case in point is the experience of
New Zealand.27 According the Reserve Bank Act of 1989, the Reserve Bank of New Zealand in
carrying  out  monetary  policy  is guided by  a  single objective, namely,  the achievement and
maintenance of  stability in the  general  level of  prices.  In  operational terms,  this  has  been
translated  into an  inflation target  of zero  to 2  percent.  On some  occasions, private  capital
inflows have produced  a  large nominal appreciation of  the New Zealand dollar.  Given the
weight of imports in expenditure, a large (exchange rate induced) fall in import prices could push
inflation below the zero end of the target range.  Since the law regards a breach of the low end of
the target  symmetrically to a  breach of the high end,  this  puts the monetary  authorities in a
dilemma:  either intervene to blunt the nominal appreciation (and accept the implications of that
sterilized  intervention)  or  alter  (ease) the  stance of  monetary  policy  (away  from  domestic
requirements) to stay within the inflation target.  The point is that while floating rates give more
control  over  domestic  monetary  policy  than  do  more  fixed  rate  regimes,  the  insulation  of
monetary policy from capital inflows is seldom complete (whatever the de jure arrangements for
central bank independence).
A second option is to use  an intermediate regime,  such as  a system of exchange  rate
bands around either a fixed or crawling central parity.  When the surge comes, the authorities
might then widen the band; if pressure keeps up,  they could later change (revalue) the central
rate or adjust the rate of crawl.
Like all intermediate regimes, this offers the best -- and worst-- of both worlds.  On one
side, the authorities don't  need to turn over the determination of the rate to market forces, and if
flows  reverse  themselves,  they  can  still  get  some  anti-inflation discipline  by  changing  the
nominal  rate by  less  than the differential rate of  inflation between the host  country  and  the
countries whose currencies make up the peg or basket.  Also, the position of the exchange rate in
27  See Branch  [1994].
22the band may give authorities and the public some indication of the equilibrium rate; a reversal
of  flows might  be  accommodated without changing the  central rate;  and  the  two-nature  of
movement within the band might discourage speculative pressures (Schadler et al [1993]).  More
pessimistically,  the  width  of  the  band  and  the  rate  of  crawl  may  be  insufficient either  to
accommodate market pressures or to preserve monetary policy control.  Also,  if capital flows
reverse, political sensitivities may prevent the central rate or rate of crawl from being adjusted in
a timely enough fashion to prevent a large misalignment and the ensuing exchange market crisis.
Both Chile and Mexico have employed such intermediate exchange rate regimes in recent
years  (Corbo  and  Hernandez  [1993]).  As part  of  its efforts  to  mitigate the macroeconomic
effects of capital inflows, the Chilean authorities appreciated the central value of the exchange
rate  band  in  June  1991.  Then  in  January  1992,  they revalued  the peso  by  5  percent  and
increased  the width  of  the exchange rate  band  from  plus/minus 5  percent  to  plus/minus  10
percent.  This was followed in July 1992 by a switch in the peg from the U.S.  dollar to a basket
of currencies (presumably to increase the uncertainty about the evolution of the exchange rate).
All the while,  the authorities were sterilizing heavily, and later  in the inflow period,  placing
penalties on capital inflows as well.  Mexico too used a widening of the exchange rate band as
part of its policy arsenal for dealing with capital inflows.  That exchange rate regime,  however,
later proved insufficiently flexible to prevent an overvaluation of the peso and an exchange rate
crisis (in December 1994).
The third option is to maintain a fixed nominal exchange rate.  Encompassed under this
regime are a set of possible policy responses to capital inflows.  Intervention can be unsterilized
or sterilized.  Monetary policy can be implemented in a discretionary way (within the constraint
of defending the fixed rate) or it can be rule-based (as in a currency board).  Sterilization can be
used alone to limit the rise in the real exchange rate or it can be supplemented (where feasible)
by restrictive fiscal policy.  Since many of these flanking policies will be discussed later in this
section, suffice here to make a few points.
The predominant motivation for keeping the rate fixed in the face of a large capital inflow
is that,  for  some countries, the nominal exchange rate may be  the best  anchor for  monetary
policy.  In the wake of earlier unsuccessful attempts to rein-in inflation by other methods, some
countries may regard it as short sighted to abandon an exchange rate orientation of stabilization
policy -- especially when the capital inflow may turn out to be of short duration.  In a similar
vein, the rule-based discipline of a currency board may be viewed as the only way to insulate
monetary policy over the longer-term from political pressures and external shocks.  Argentina
and Hong Kong are but two examples of countries that have concluded that "tying their hands"
on  monetary policy  via a  currency board  or  a  fixed exchange rate has  longer-term  stability
advantages that outweigh any costs associated with a loss of monetary policy independence.
By sterilizing the effect of the inflows on the monetary aggregates and/or by tightening
fiscal policy, adherents of fixed nominal rates may also reckon that it will be feasible to keep the
23lid  on  inflationary pressures  and  to  limit  to  tolerable  amounts the  appreciation  of  the  real
exchange  rate.  And  even  if  the  real  exchange  rate  and  the  current  account  deficit  rise
significantly, the country may have enough of a reserve cushion to ride it out.
The pitfalls of such an exchange rate policy are well known.  The capital inflow may be
too large and too expensive to sterilize effectively.  Fiscal policy may drift off course and be too
inflexible to turn around at short notice.  A rise in inflation and in the real exchange rate, cum a
widening of the current account deficit, may shake the confidence of foreign investors.  Private
capital  outflows,  falling  reserves,  the adverse effect  of  a  high  interest  rate  defense  on  the
financial sector, and the reluctance to let go of the nominal exchange rate (for political reasons),
may then ultimately set the stage for a currency crisis.  In the case of a currency board,  should
an external shock (like a rise in international interest rates) depress creditworthiness and lead to a
fall in reserves,  the monetary rule may not give adequate leeway to the central bank  to act as
lender of last resort to troubled financial institutions.
If the country maintains a fixed rate during the capital inflow and is keen to limit the rise
in the real exchange rate, experience suggests that accompanying fiscal tightening is a key ally.
Beyond that, the composition of absorption makes a difference.  If investment falls more heavily
on  imported  goods  than  does  either  private  or  public  consumption,  then  investment-led
expansions will be kinder to the real exchange rate than other absorption patterns.  As hinted at
earlier, this  (along with  stronger sterilization capabilities) may explain why real exchange rate
appreciation has been less prevalent in Asian host countries than in Latin American ones.
Sterilization policy
Authorities in host countries face three basic decisions about use of sterilization policy:
whether to sterilize, how to sterilize, and how much and how long to sterilize.  Each merits some
discussion.
One way to approach the first question is to consider the circumstances under  which it
would be appropriate nQ=  to sterilize.
One  such circumstance is  when the demand for  money in  the host country  has been
increased by a  permanent reduction in the rate of inflation which increases confidence in the
store-of-value function of domestic money.  In this  case, the monetary  effects of the capital
inflow will be  willingly held.  Effects on  inflation, absorption, and the current account occur
only  when  there  are  excess  money balances.  A  similar  line  of  argument  would  apply  to
situations in which there is a genuine credit shortage in the host country.
A second circumstance in which sterilization would not be appropriate is when absorption
prior  to  the inflow has been kept undesirably low.  A classic case in point is the Romanian
experience  of  the late  1980s when  the Ceausescu regime  manipulated the  saving-investment
24balance to ensure current account surpluses to repay the entire external debt.  As a result, there
was a  sharp decline in living standards, in the quality of investment, and in economic growth
(Calvo,  Sahay,  and  Vegh  [1994]).  Here,  an  increase  in  consumption could justifiably  be
regarded as a move toward an equilibrium level, rather than a temporary binge.  So long as the
increase in consumption or investment is sustainable, sterilization can be dispensed with.
Yet a third rationale for not sterilizing is the availability of other policy instruments that
could deal with the capital inflow at lower cost (more on the cost of sterilization below).  As
noted earlier,  for  countries that don't  need to use the exchange rate as  a nominal anchor,  an
appreciation of the nominal rate offers a way to minimize the effect of the inflow on the external
component of the monetary base, that is, there will be much less to sterilize in the first place.  In
general, the greater the degree of exchange rate flexibility, the less the need for sterilization.
In a similar vein, further liberalization of capital outflows and of imports is sometimes
put forward as an alternative to sterilization.  The basic idea here is to open the exit doors wider
after the surge so that the size of the n= capital inflow (or the change in international reserves) is
much smaller.  Although a number of host countries (e.g.,  Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Thailand)
have taken such measures as part of their response to capital inflows, one should be  skeptical
about such fine tuning of the liberalization process.  For one thing,  it may not reduce the net
inflow at all.  Foreign investors, particularly institutional investors, place a high value on being
able to  "get out"  of a  market when the risk/return  outlook deteriorates.  Liberalizing capital
outflows may therefore make the host country a more attractive place to invest and could induce
greater inflows.  Import liberalization, by improving resource allocation, could well operate in
the same direction.
If  none  of  the  above circumstances apply,  then  the  host  country  authority  will  see
sterilization as having an appeal.  After all, if the nominal exchange has been used successfully
to control inflation for some time, allowing the capital inflow to translate itself into a sharp rise
in inflation would undermine the authorities credibility.  Moreover,  if the authorities have good
reason to believe that the inflow will fuel an unsustainable consumption boom or a surge of bank
lending for highly speculative activities (e.g.,  equity market speculation or excessive lending for
real estate), sterilization offers a way to blunt those effects.  More generally, sterilization is a
way for the authorities to try to prevent the capital inflow from driving their original economic
policy strategy off-track.
The question of how to sterilize comes up because there is more than one way to do so.
The  most  popular method is  to  exchange domestic government bonds for  foreign exchange,
thereby  offsetting  the  effects  of  the  initial  exchange  market  intervention  (the  exchange  of
domestic money for foreign exchange) on the monetary base, and preventing any induced effects
on aggregate demand.  There are two relevant constraints.  One is the fiscal cost.  Because the
interest rate on domestic bonds in host developing countries is typically much higher than the
yield on holdings of international reserves (e.g.,  U.S.  Treasury bills), an exchange of domestic
25bonds for  foreign exchange is a  loss-making transaction (more on  this below).  The second
constraint is the size of the central bank's  balance sheet and the depth of the government bond
market.  If the central bank doesn't  have many government bonds in its possession, it won't  be
able to withdraw much liquidity from the system by selling them;  it would have to  issue new
bonds to do so.  Similarly, if the market is very thin, it will be difficult and expensive to find
purchasers for  these bonds.  Corbo  and Hernandez  [1993] cite  the lack of a  well-developed
market  for  government  securities  as  constraining the  capacity  of  the  Korean  authorities  to
sterilize the monetary effects of the capital inflow.
An alternative way to go is to increase reserve requirements on banks.  This constrains
the ability of banks to lend, thereby reducing the size of the money multiplier and the effect of
the inflow on the money supply (for a given increase in the monetary base).  This is the intent.
It also avoids the fiscal costs associated with open market operations.  If the reserve requirement
is set very high (say, 100 percent beyond a benchmark), it will lower interest rates on deposits
and discourage further inflows.
Since required reserves are rarely remunerated at market rates, this is basically a tax on
the banks.  Domestic banks will therefore lose profitability and business relative to foreign banks
and to domestic non-banks.
Whether this tax on the banks is a good thing or not depends on several considerations.
If the non-bank sector is significant and can provide good substitutes for bank deposits, then the
tax may simply shift the intermediation of inflows to non-banks, with little effect on total lending
or aggregate demand.  In Korea,  for example, the imposition of high nonremunerated reserve
requirements on  commercial banks,  cum tighter  regulations on  the  market  for  bank  credit,
coincided with  a  significant shift  in deposits from  banks to  nonbanks.  Similarly, very  high
reserve requirements on banks in the Philippines may be partly responsible for the relatively low
level of bank intermediation in the financial system.  The more bank denominated is the local
financial system, the less likely is this to happen in the relevant time frame.
There is also the matter of the health of the banking system.  If the intermediation of
these inflows was to support good credit risks,  then taking that business away from domestic
banks could be costly to the industry's long-term future.  On the other hand, if the demand for
credit originates mainly in high-risk sectors, then allowing foreign banks to grab a greater share
of these risks reduces the potential call on the host authorities to provide emergency assistance
should such lending subsequently go sour (Hausman [1993]).
Other  methods  of  sterilizing  inflows  include  shifting  government  deposits  from
commercial banks to the central bank, curtailing access to rediscount facilities, and increasing
interest rates on  central bank  assets and  liabilities.  The scope for using these less orthodox
sterilization measures differs widely across countries.  For example, Reisen [1993a] documents
how several  East Asian economies (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and  Taiwan)  have used
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the monetary effects of capital inflows.  That  option is not  likely to  count for  much in host
countries where such public saving institutions are either much smaller on non-existent.
As noted earlier, almost all host countries sterilize at the beginning of a surge in inflows -
- if only to get breathing room to figure out what to do if the inflow proves more than a short-
run, reversible phenomenon (if the inflow is short-term and moderate in size, the consequences
are not likely to be significant, whether the authorities sterilize or not).  The real question is how
much and how long to sterilize?
A potentially serious constraint on large-scale sterilization via open market operations is
the fiscal cos  and higher level of domestic debt.  When the host country faces an interest rate
differential between home and foreign assets of say, 8-10 percent or more, and needs to mop up
liquidity equal to 3-4 percent of GDP or more, sterilizing can become an expensive proposition.
According to Calvo et al [1995] and Kiguel and Leiderman [1994], estimates of these costs range
from  .25  to  1.4 percent  of GDP  per  year for  Latin American  host countries.  Also,  if the
country's  debt-to-GDP ratio was already high, further increases in it could raise doubts about the
credibility of anti-inflationary monetary policy and of a fixed exchange rate (since the incentives
to monetize the debt or devalue would then be greater),  thereby working against the objectives
pursued by sterilization in the first place.
The second key constraint on large-scale sterilization is the interest rate effect  and its
implications for further capital inflows.  Here, a number of points are relevant.
Suppose that the net capital inflow is driven by lower interest rates abroad.  If the host-
country central bank  engages in sterilized intervention, capital inflows will be  larger,  and the
interest rate spread will be higher, than if the host country did not sterilize.  In this sense, it is
fair to say that sterilization has prolonged the conditions that gave rise to the capital inflow.  But
it is not legitimate to conclude that after sterilization the domestic interest rate will be higher than
before  sterilization,  or  that  capital inflow will  continue at the  same rate  as  before  (Frankel
[1993]).  As emphasized earlier, once investors obtain the share of domestic assets they want in
their portfolios, the capital inflow will be reduced (and will be governed by the growth of the
total portfolio).
The interest rate effect of sterilization depends in part on the assets that investors want
versus those supplied by the central bank.  If,  for example, foreign investors want equities or
foreign  direct  investment but  the central bank  carries  its  sterilization operations  in  domestic
bonds,  then the interest rate will be higher than if foreign investors wanted bonds in the first
place (Kenen [1993]).  The intuition here is that when assets are quite imperfect substitutes for
one another, it takes a larger interest rate change to accommodate investor preferences than when
assets are close substitutes.
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remain between domestic and foreign interest rates after a capital inflow, even if the authorities
don't  sterilize at all.  One might think that with all the capital that has flowed into developing
countries over  the past  five years,  domestic interest rates would by  now be close to  foreign
interest rates.  But that is not the case.  The question is why?  Frankel [1994] has recently looked
at the determinants of the differential between foreign (industrial-country) and domestic interest
rates.  He  identifies three  components of  the differential:  the expected depreciation  of  the
domestic currency, default or country risk, and the exchange risk premium (the compensation for
holding currencies that are perceived to be riskier than the foreign currency).  He finds that most
of  the  differential  typically  reflects  expected  depreciation  of  the  domestic  currency.  For
example, of the 7.7 percent differential between one year Mexican CETES and U.S.  Treasury
bills in September 1994, 3.8 percent represented expected depreciation of the peso; the country
premium  and  the exchange  risk premium  accounted for  2.1  and  1.8  percent,  respectively.
Frankel  [1994]  also  finds  that  most  of  the  time-series variation  in  the  differential  reflects
variation in expected currency movements.  In any case, one should not regard domestic assets
as close substitutes for foreign ones.
Thus far, in considering the interest rate effects of sterilization, it has been assumed that
the driving force was a reduction in foreign interest rates.  As illustrated in Section III however,
other factors can also drive net capital inflows.  Are the interest rate effects of sterilization the
same for these other kinds of shocks?  The answer is yes and no.  Yes, the domestic interest rate
will invariably be higher with sterilization than without it (no matter what the shock).  No, the
interest rate will not always be  lower after the shock cum sterilization than it was before it.
Frankel [1993] shows, for example, that if the capital inflow is driven either by an export boom
or by a rise in money demand (in the host country), then the domestic interest rate will be higher
after the shock than before it.  Edwards  [1991a] argues that just  such a  scenario (that is,  an
export  boom)  provides  the  most  convincing explanation for  why  interest  rates  in  Colombia
remained high after a large capital inflow cum large-scale sterilization.
But what if,  despite these considerations, the host country wants to make heavy use of
sterilized intervention.  If  it maintains a  fixed exchange rate  and  a  completely  open  capital
account, will sterilized intervention permit it to control the money supply and run an independent
monetary policy?  Economic theory says no.  Industrial-country experience also seems to answer
in the negative.  Germany, for example, eventually had to abandon fixed rates in the early 1970s
in order to run an independent monetary policy; heavy intervention was not able to turn the tide.
The same outcome prevailed in 1992-93 when, despite huge amounts of sterilized intervention, it
proved necessary to resort to realignments and much wider exchange rate bands in the ERM in
order to accommodate a greater degree of monetary policy independence among members.
But maybe host developing countries are in a different situation.  Reisen [1993a, 1993b],
in particular,  takes the view that a group of East Asian developing countries has been able to
employ sterilized intervention effectively enough to achieve simultaneously fixed exchange rates,
28open capital markets, and independent monetary policy.  He attributes this to the "art of central
banking"  in the region, including the pragmatic use of public institutions (e.g.,  social security
funds, state enterprises) as monetary instruments.  Others, while not denying the relatively high
autonomy of monetary policy in the region, take a more conventional explanation of what  lies
behind it.  Specifically, they argue either that nominal exchange rates have not been completely
fixed  (Claassen [1993]), or  that  capital mobility is imperfect (Fry  [1993]), or  that  domestic
financial markets are not yet liberalized enough for interest rate changes to have much effect on
the real economy (Frankel [1993]).  All of this makes it easier to implement sterilization in this
region than elsewhere (although the same argument would imply that this difference would fade
over time, as capital market integration and domestic financial liberalization increased). 28
Fiscal policy
The  good  news  about  using  fiscal  policy  in  the  face  of  large  inflows  is  that  the
prescription is relatively straightforward.  The bad news is that, at least so far,  few countries
have indicated that they are ready to take the medicine.
As  indicated earlier,  a tightening of fiscal policy during the surge can help to restrain
aggregate demand and inflation, can limit the appreciation of the real exchange rate (particularly
when much of government expenditure falls on nontradables), can reduce the deterioration of the
current account (when government expenditure falls on tradables), can discourage further inflows
(by lowering interest rates). and can raise national saving (thereby making room for higher levels
of  investment and  exports).  If  the  host  country has  a  medium-term problem  of  excessive
indebtedness, or if there is evidence that private investment carries a higher rate of return than
public investment, the argument would only be strengthened.
The factual record tells us, however, that most host countries (Indonesia and Thailand are
two of the exceptions) have n= implemented a significant tightening of fiscal policy during the
surge period (Calvo et al [1995], Schadler et al [1993], Dooley et al [1994]).  Apparently, host
countries have either decided that it is not advisable to alter their longer-term fiscal plans to deal
with a capital inflow, or more likely, have not been able to gamer the requisite political support
for such fiscal contraction.
28  Inferences  about the effectiveness  of sterilization  in other host country  regions  has sometimes  been based on
empirical  estimates  of so-called  "offset  coefficients."  This is a method  that derives  from the monetary  approach  to
the balance  of payments  under  fixed  exchange  rates. It leads  to an estimating  equation  where  one can determine  how
much of a change  in net domestic  assets  leaks  out into  the balance  of payments. If all of it does, the offset coefficient
is unity, and the implication  is that  sterilized  intervention  would  be ineffective.  Schadler  et al [1993]  estimate  such an
offset equation  for five host developing  countries,  and find  some scope  for monetary  policy  independence  in four of
them.
29As noted earlier, many host countries underwent significant fiscal consolidation prior  to
the inflow period.  Given the size of net capital inflows, a  further tightening equal to  several
percentage points of GDP may have been too much to ask.
Pressures to spend, whether for infrastructure, education, or other purposes, may intensify in a
setting of  increased growth  and  high  availability of  external finance  (Bercuson  and  Koenig
[19931). Or it could be that fiscal policy is viewed as being too inflexible to be of assistance in a
situation where the duration of the capital inflow is itself uncertain.  Future research will need to
sort it out.
Regulatory and supervisory policy 29
Regulatory  and  supervisory policy  encompasses the whole  set  of  rules  and  practices
associated with official oversight over the operation of financial institutions and the functioning
of financial markets.  The relevance of these policies to  the discussion at hand  is  that 1=
and/or volatile capital flows can exacerbate existing weaknesses in the financial systems of host
countries.  These concerns affect both the banking sector and equity markets.
Baanks  are at the center of the financial system in host developing countries,  with bank
assets typically accounting for at least half of total financial assets.  It  is no surprise then that
banks play a key role in the intermediation of capital inflows, as well as a direct  importer of
funds.  This  role  is  most  obvious  when the  capital inflow enters  as  in  increase  in  foreign
liabilities of domestic banks and is used to fund an increase in bank lending.  But even when
foreign  capital  flows  in  as  foreign  direct  investment,  bond  issuance,  or  equity  portfolio
investment, the deposits and reserves  of the banking system will temporarily increase.  This
because investment in a nonbank financial asset still requires that the foreign investor use a local
deposit  to  pay  for  it  (Folkerts-Landau  et  al  [1995]).  Unless  the  increase  in  local  bank
deposits/reserves  are either  offset via sterilization operations or used  to  import goods and/or
assets, there will be an increase in bank lending.
In the event, net capital inflows have typically been accompanied by increases in domestic
credit  in  host  countries  (Fernandez-Arias and  Montiel  [1995]).  As  one  might  expect,  the
expansion in commercial bank assets -- and the increase in domestic lending more specifically--
have  been  largest  in  those  host  countries  with  the  largest  net  inflows.? 0 For  instance,  in
Thailand, the ratio of bank assets to GDP rose from 73 percent in 1988 to 102 percent in 1993,
while the private  loan to GDP ratio  increased from  51 to 79 percent over  (almost) the  same
29  Much of this section draws heavily on Folkerts-Landau  et al 119951;  the reader is referred there for more
extensive  discussion  of these  issues.
See Folkerts-Landau  et at [1995].
30period.31 In  some cases,  funding for  these loans  was facilitated by the banks'  own foreign
borrowing.  For example, the ratio of commercial bank gross foreign liabilities to GDP jumped
sharply during the surge period in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand.
Such increases in the size of commercial bank balance sheets and in bank lending would
be no cause for concern if banks' own risk management systems were well developed, and if the
regulatory and supervisory framework were uniformly effective.  Enough to say that this has not
3 2 always been the case.  Weaknesses stem from a variety of sources.
In some host countries, there is a long tradition of allocating a fixed proportion of bank
loans  to  particular  sectors  (heavy  industry,  agriculture,  small-scale  enterprises)  on  non-
commercial terms to  further  government economic policy objectives.  In others,  lending has
sometime becomes highly concentrated in sectors  (e.g.,  construction and real  estate) that are
known to  be  risky  and  vulnerable to  interest rate  and  cyclical fluctuations.  Large  exposure
guidelines are often thwarted by extensive lending to bank-related borrowers  or by accounting
practices that permit borrowers to use a fictitious name when doing business with a bank.  And
independent internal oversight of lending decisions by a credit review committee has been far
from a universal practice.
Nor  have banks  in  host  developing countries  been immune  from  structural  changes,
moral hazard problems, and maturity mismatches that have contributed to banking problems in
some industrial countries.  Liberalization of capital markets and the trend toward  securitization
have made it possible for blue chip firms to tap international markets directly by issuing bonds
and stocks.  This departure of the most creditworthy clients has increased the average riskiness
of  bank  credit.  The  presence  of  (non  risk-weighted) deposit  insurance,  of  central  bank
rediscounting  of  credits,  and  of  implicit  "too-big-to-fail" emergency liquidity  assistance has
reduced the  incentive of  private market  participants,  as well as  of  the banks  themselves,  to
monitor  risk.  One  of the reasons banks are  "special" is that  they provide  short-term  liquid
liabilities and  longer-term  illiquid  assets  (typically business  loans).  But  that  liquidity  and
maturity mismatch is their Achilles heel when depositors/creditors lose confidence and "run."
The supervisory and regulatory framework for banks has likewise sometimes been part of
the problem.  While most host countries have introduced versions of the Basle risk-weighted
capital standards, poor accounting standards can make it difficult to ascertain the quality of bank
assets;  for  example, bad  loans and  capital losses may be  obscured by  recapitalizing  interest
payments.  In some places, companies face no penalties if the information provided to auditors is
subsequently shown to be incorrect.  Required loan-loss provisions can be set at very low levels.
31See  Folkerts-Landau  et al [1995].
32  See  Folkerts-Landau  et al [1995],  Wang  and  Shilling  [1995],  and Rojas-Suarez  and Weisbrod  [1994].
31And banking supervisors may not have the legal authority to  seize assets, or  issue cease and
desist orders, or close insolvent banks.
Large and  volatile capital flows can magnify the consequences of these weaknesses in
host-country banking systems -- much in the same way that the oil price increases of the 1970s
magnified the consequences of existing structural rigidities in oil-importing countries.  Faulty
credit  assessment becomes a more  serious problem when the  volume of bank  credit  soars.
Maturity mismatches between bank assets and bank liabilities become a more pressing concern
when capital outflows and deposit withdrawals force the liquidation of bank loans.  And high
concentration of bank lending to interest-rate-sensitive sectors bites with greater force when large
fluctuations in foreign interest rates drive flows in and out of the banking system.
On the equity market side, weaknesses and vulnerabilities primarily reflect the facts that
the  infrastructure  servicing these markets  is of  relatively recent  origin  and  that  the markets
themselves are still too small to  absorb large portfolio flows without strains. 33 Again,  when
capital inflows are large, these weaknesses and vulnerabilities take on added significance.
Accounting and  disclosure requirements are being tightened in many emerging  equity
markets  but  are  nevertheless still  less stringent than those  in  the world's  premier  markets.
Market  participants  cannot  assess  and  price  risk  appropriately  unless  they  have  adequate
information.  The lower is the quality of public disclosure, the greater the risk of volatility and
contagion  from  rumors.  Excessive leverage in  derivative markets  can  fuel speculation and
volatility.  Some emerging equity markets have serious regulation on margin trading and short
selling, while others do not.  Clearance and settlement systems are yet another important aspect
of the infrastructure.  Daily marking-to-market of positions, clear position limits, establishment
of capital requirements for exchange and clearinghouse members, and short settlement periods,
all help to  inhibit systemic risk.  In some emerging equity markets,  clearance and settlement
systems already contain these features; in others, they do not.
When the size of the portfolio capital flow is large relative to the size of the host country
equity market, the stage is set for large fluctuations in that flow to generate high price volatility
aiid large shifts in market liquidity.  In this connection, there were  individual months in  1993
when net capital inflows from  the United States alone represented  10 and 30 percent  of the
average  monthly trading  volumes on  the Hong  Kong stock  market  and  the Mexican  Bolsa,
respectively (Folkerts-Landau et al [1995]).  What then can the host country do to miniimize  its
vulnerability?  Three broad options stand out.
The first one would be to strengthen the regulatory and supervisory framework before the
surge in capital inflows takes place, or to say much the same thing, to match the pace of capital
See Wang  and Shilling  [1995]  and  Folkerts-Landau  et al [1995].
32market liberalization to the capacity of the regulatory and  supervisory structure.  This  would
prevent  the  former  from  overwhelming  the  latter  and  should  reduce  the  prospect  of  poor
allocation of  foreign resources and of large public-sector liabilities to  bail-out failed  financial
institutions  (Fischer  and  Reisen  [1994]).  Such improvements would  also  enhance  the  host
country's  long-term attractiveness to foreign investors since the latter prefer to  operate where
there are adequate safeguards against systemic risk  and where markets have high transparency
and integrity.  The main rub to this first-best solution is that the political support for significant
regulatory reform may be difficult to muster.  In addition,  there  is the practical problem  of
forecasting the timing and scale of private capital inflows.
The second option is to try to improve regulation and supervision "on the fly"  (that is,
during the surge period itself), while simultaneously sterilizing much of the inflow.  This is what
many host countries have in fact tried to do.  While one can't  isolate the independent effect of
supervisory and regulatory policy changes, the record of financial difficulties is a mixed one.  In
a  number of high-inflow host countries, the ratio of non-performing loans to total  loans hit 6
percent or more sometime during  the 1990s; 3 4 in some of those, the ratio  improved from the
beginning of the surge period, while in others it deteriorated.  Financial difficulties were severe
enough in Venezuela to require a large-scale recapitalization of the banking system. 35
Yet a third option is to impose temporary controls and/or taxes on capital inflows so as to
reduce the proximate source of increased pressure on the financial system.  Since this policy
option is relevant for much of what has been discussed earlier in this paper, it merits its own
treatment.
Controls or taxes on capital inflows
The case for controls or taxes on capital inflows is almost invariably the case against the
alternatives.  Specifically,  if  the host  country believes  that there  are high  costs  or  binding
constraints that limit its recourse to the more conventional policy responses to  capital inflows
(nominal  exchange  rate  appreciation,  sterilization,  fiscal  restraint,  and  tightening  up  the
regulatory and supervisory framework), then controls or taxes on capital inflows will carry some
appeal.  Economic  theory  even  suggests  that  there  are  certain  circumstances under  which
imposition of such controls could be welfare enhancing.  The "theory of the second best" tells us
that if there is a distortion in place that cannot be removed, then introduction of an offsetting
distortion may  improve welfare.  For example, if  the bulk of capital inflows financed highly
For purposes of comparison,  this ratio hit 7-9 percent in three Nordic countries (Finland, Norway, and
Sweden)  at the peak  of their banking  problems  in 1992,  and 6 percent  in the United  States  in 1991.
35  More recently, banking system strains in Mexico  and Argentina  also required  significant  official support
operations.
33speculative  investments in  the  real  estate  sector  and  if  the  host-country government  had  a
consistent track record of bailing-out all such large failed investments, then a ceiling or tax on
capital inflows could be justified as second best.  It would not be as good as eliminating bail-outs
and allowing capital inflows, but it would be better than permitting more inflows cum bail-outs.
No host country has made controls or taxes on inflows the centerpiece of its economic
policy during the surge period, but quite a few (Chile, Colombia, Indonesia, Mexico, Thailand)
have employed  such  instruments as  part  of their  arsenal.  These  impediments have  taken a
variety of forms, including:  high reserve requirements on new or existing credits and deposits
from abroad, ceilings and/or required authorization for foreign borrowing by banks and public
enterprises,  imposition of withholding taxes on foreign exchange receipts, higher commissions
on swap operations, and prohibition of interest payments on convertible bank accounts held by
non-residents in the host country.
When you cut to the chase, there are two key questions about use of such controls or
taxes:  first,  will they be effective in reducing inflows; and second, even if they are effective,
will they be desirable on a broader cost-benefit calculus?
On effectiveness, the existing literature suggests that controls or taxes can slow inflows in
the short term  (up to six months or a year) but that this effect deca  as market participants
search out and find channels of evasion.  Under or over-invoicing of trade,  substitution from
prohibited  instruments and  highly  taxed  institutions to  permitted  and  less taxed  ones  (from
portfolio flows to foreign direct investment, and from banks to  nonbanks), and more intensive
use of parallel exchange and financial markets, often characterize such evasion.  The greater the
incentives to evade the controls, the more difficult it will be to stop it.  Mathieson and Rojas-
Suarez [1993], after studying the experience of both  industrial and  developing countries with
capital  controls  over  the  past  two  decades,  conclude that  the  effectiveness of  controls  has
declined over  time  because the transactions costs of  moving funds have decreased while the
3 6 incentives for doing so have gone up.
Typically,  the host country finds that to  restrict  the opportunities for  substitution and
evasion, it has to widen progressively the scope of the controls.  For example, Chile broadened
the coverage of its higher reserve requirements three times after it was first introduced in June
1991 (Schadler et al [1993]).  Yet as the scope of the restrictions are broadened, it becomes more
likely that  "good" flows (e.g.,  trade credits) get penalized along with  "bad" flows (e.g.,  hot
money).  What's more, once countries have made the move to deregulation of capital flows, they
36  The literature does not address the question of  whether controls on capital inflows are  more effective than
those on capital outflows.  It is worth noting that none of  the three countries (Spain, Portugal,  and  Ireland) that
introduced or tightened capital controls during the 1992 ERM crisis (to slow outflows) were successful in avoiding a
devaluation;  in addition, each of  them dropped these restrictions a  short time after  the crisis (see Goldstein et  al
[1993]).  On the other hand, the experiences of Chile and Malaysia seem to suggest some effectiveness for controls,
at least in the short-term, in reducing the volume of inflows.
34find that they no longer have the administrative apparatus needed to police compliance with new
controls.
Even if controls and/or taxes were effective in slowing capital inflows over the medium
term, host countries would still need to decide whether it was in the their long-term interest to
impose them.  For  the foreign investor, imposition of controls/taxes reduces liquidity in  the
domestic  market,  and more generally,  increases the perceived risk  of  doing business in  that
market.  As such, the foreign investor is going to demand to be compensated for this increased
Lisk by asking for a premium on the host country's debt and security obligations.  Unfortunately,
the existing literature  doesn't  really tell us how large that premium would be  for the kind of
controls/taxes imposed by host countries in the 1990s.  Nevertheless, the greater the present and
expected future reliance on foreign investors to fund the government's debt and to help finance
domestic investment, the more costly would  any such increase in the risk premium be.  These
longer-run costs have to be weighed against any gains that controls might offer on the prudential
and macroeconomic stability fronts.
V.  Lessons
At the risk of ignoring some themes and oversimplying others, three  lessons stand out
from  the  preceding  discussion  of  the  causes  and  consequences of  large  capital  inflows  to
developing countries.
Lesson number one is while there are legitimate grounds for optimism in the longer-term
outlook for  private  capital flows to  developing countries,  there  is  little  to  suggest  that  the
volatili4y that has characterized past flows has will go away.  Accordingly, in designing their
policy strategies to deal with this volatility in private capital flows, there is a premium to be put
on credibility, resiliency and flexibility.
To be sure, the surge of private capital flows to developing countries in the 1990s is one
reflection of the recognition in the industrial countries that parts of the developing world offer
enormous  long-term  commercial opportunities  for  businessmen  and  investors.  Developing
countries have increased significantly their shares of world output and of world trade over the
past  fifteen  years.37 Looking  down  the  road,  potential  growth  rates  in  the  high-inflow
developing countries  are  widely regarded  to  be  much  above those  in  industrial  countries.
Progress in macroeconomic and structural policy reform in host countries, along with reductions
of their external debt burdens, has boosted their creditworthiness and helped both to induce the
3  According  to the IMF [1995],  the share of developing  countries in global  output (using  purchasing-power-
parity  exchange  rates) was 39 percent  in 1993,  up from 31 percent  in 1984;  if transition  economies  were added  to that
camp,  that (1993)  share  would  rise to about  45 percent.  Trade  shares  of the developing  countries  are lower but follow
a similar  trend  to that  of output  shares.
35return  of  flight  capital  and  to  attract  new  more  conservative  institutional  investors.  The
globalization of  production,  sourcing,  and  marketing decisions, the  growing maturity  of  the
market  for  developing-country securities,  and the positive effect of  regional and  global trade
liberalization on prospects for developing-country exports, have operated in the same direction.
Because returns on emerging market securities have been high and weakly correlated with those
in industrial countries,  and because institutional investors in the major creditor  countries now
have such a small share (1-2 percent) of their portfolios invested in emerging market securities,
this  share  could  well rise  appreciably (double or  quadruple) over  the  next  decade  or  so.
Moreover,  since the portfolios of these investors are so large, such an increase in the weight of
emerging markets would translate into a significant addition to net capital flows.
At the same time, some of the changes in the nature of private capital flows to developing
countries that have taken place since the last surge in the mid-to-late 1970s, have underlined the
potential for short-term volatility.  Consider the shift away from bank loans to portfolio capital
and foreign direct investment.  Since holders of portfolio capital are well diversified, there is a
presumption that a sharp decline in bond and equity prices in emerging markets would translate
into only a  modest decline in their wealth and thus pose less of a  systemic threat in  creditor
countries than did the bank insolvencies in the last debt crisis. 3 8 This should aid stability of
flows.  But forces working the other direction are likely to be more powerful.  Specifically, the
greater liquidity of securitized instruments, the now larger exposure of creditors to currency risk,
the  declining cost  of  rearranging  the  asset  composition  of  portfolios,  and  the  pressure  on
portfolio managers to  outperform the market average over  short and long  time horizons,  will
probably  work  to  make  private  flows  in  the  future  even  more  responsive  to  shifts  in  the
perceived risk/return outlook for countries than they have been in the past.
While it is often assumed that flows of foreign direct investment (or of long maturity instruments
in general) are less  "reversible" than other types of capital flows ("hot money"),  recent  work
fmds  scant empirical  support for  that  proposition. 39 The  influence of  swings  in  industrial-
country interest rates on these private capital flows has already been apparent.  On top of this,
there  are  the  other  traditional  sources  of  volatility,  ranging  from  terms-of-trade changes to
variations in the pace and scope of economic policy reform in the host countries.  Also, the large
size of institutional investor portfolios relative to the capitalization of emerging equity markets
means  that  seemingly  modest  portfolio  reweightings can  result  in  sharp  swings  in  market
liquidity and in asset prices.
38  Note too that the decentralized  nature of bond and equity holders may also make it more difficult for the
official  sector  to orchestrate  a "workout"  once  a financial  crisis occurs;  see Cline  [1995].
See Claessens  et al [1993].  Foreign direct investment,  however,  may offer other advantages  to the host
country;  see Husain  and  Jun [1992].
36What can host countries do to minimize and/or cope better with such volatility in private
flows?  For starters, while some factors giving rise to volatility (e.g.,  changes in international
interest rates) are clearly beyond their control, others are not.  In particular, creditors will have
less  reason  to  bolt  if  exchange  rate,  macroeconomic,  and  structural  policies  remain  on  a
disciplined  course,  consistent  with  sound  economic fundamentals.  This  means,  inter  alia,
avoiding highly overvalued real exchange rates, excessive current account deficits, unsustainable
consumption booms,  large  upsurges  in  inflation,  and  rapid  runups  in  fiscal  deficits  and  in
external debt-to-GNP ratios.  Credible policies don't guarantee stable and secularly rising capital
inflows, but they sure help.  The scale, terms, and geographic destination of private capital flows
are not random.
Resiliency and flexibility also count.  If private flows are known to be very sensitive to
the  stance of  monetary  policy  in creditor  countries  and  if  that  stance is  subject to  periodic
swings,  then there is particular merit  in  maintaining a healthy cushion of  liquid international
reserves, in avoiding the rollover risk associated with a heavy reliance on short-term government
debt, in minimizing the extent of maturity and currency mismatches, in banks holding adequate
capital against market risks, and in preventing a large concentration of loans from developing in
interest rate-sensitive sectors.
Flexibility is an ally because large changes in the size and/or direction of flows call for
adjustments in economic policies.  For example, in the initial stage of a capital inflow, the host
country may be able to get by with sterilization operations.  But as the size and persistence of the
flow increases, sterilization will become more costly and less effective.  It will then usually be
necessary to tighten fiscal policy to help restrain inflation and aggregate demand, and eventually
to "adjust" to the transfer by providing more flexibility to the nominal exchange rate and/or by
monetizing more of the inflow.  And if the private capital flow reverses  direction,  flexibility
becomes even more essential to accommodate the new realities.
A second lesson is that dealing with large capital inflows is not  an  area of economic
policy  that  lends  itself well  to  "one  size  fits  all"  policy  prescriptions.  Individual-country
circumstances and differences in economic structure matter.  As demonstrated earlier, there has
been very considerable variation across countries in the policy responses to large inflows.  This
is  no  accident.  The  factors that  do  and  should condition  a  host  country's  policy  response
include:  the host country's  anti-inflationary track record, the openness of the economy to foreign
trade, the degree of irreversibility of trade reforms, the state of public finances (both in terms of
the current fiscal deficit and the ratio of external and internal government debt to GDP), the size
and  liquidity of  the domestic bond  market,  the health  of  domestic banks and  the  degree  of
competition from  non-banks, the flexibility of fiscal policy,  the quality of the regulatory  and
supervisory framework over financial firms and activities, and the market's perception about the
host country's longer-term commitment to deregulation and policy reform.
37Finally, lesson number three is that, country differences not withstanding, host countries
need to respect the basics of adjustment and finance in designing their policy response to large
inflows.
On  exchange  rate  policy,  host  countries  that  want  to  continue  to  use  the  nominal
exchange rate as their key nominal anchor and that don't  want to accept much of an appreciation
in their real exchange rate, have to be prepared to implement some tightening of fiscal  [poliY.
This is the most reliable way to reduce aggregate demand, to keep inflation in check, and to limit
the deterioration  in the current account.  Sterilization operations can substitute for this  fiscal
tightening in the short term but not in the longer term.  Host countries who are prepared to allow
the nominal exchange rate to appreciate -- be it via managed floating or via adjustments in the
exchange rate band -- have more leeway because the nominal appreciation will reduce the foreign
demand  for  home  assets  and  will  have  a  contractionary  effect  on  aggregate  demand  and
inflationary pressures.  As highlighted by the Mexican economic crisis, whatever the advantages
of  using  the  nominal  exchange  rate  as  an  anchor  against  inflation  in  the  early  stages  of
disinflation, delaying for too long the move to greater exchange rate flexibility in the face of a
deteriorating competitive position and a large and rising current account deficit risks having the
markets force a less orderly and more costly correction.
With respect to sterilization policy, the domestic interest will be higher and the size of the
inflow will be  larger with  sterilization than without it.  This does not mean that  sterilization
should be  avoided.  In  fact, as laid out  in  Section IV,  sterilization can be  a  valuable policy
instrument  during  the  early  stages  of  inflow  in  moderating or  even  offsetting  the  induced
expansion of domestic credit.  Also, if  sterilization is implemented via an increase  in reserve
requirements rather than via open market operations, the host country can for a while escape the
fiscal costs by essentially taxing the domestic banking sector.  The key however is that with high
capital  mobility,  sterilization  becomes  more  expensive  and  less  effective  the  longer  it  is
employed.  If the inflow continues on a large scale and the scope for fiscal tightening is modest,
some monetization of  the inflow  will usually emerge  as the  lesser  of several  uncomfortable
alternatives.
Regulatory and  supervisory policy  often gets less  attention than other  components of
economic policy package.  Yet it too is basic in conditioning the consequences of large capital
inflows. Whether capital inflows turn out in the end to have been a good thing hinges in large
part on how foreign resources are used.  It makes a big difference, for example, if banks use
their higher reserves to lend for productive investment and human capital formation than if they
use them to fund speculative activities that eventually translate into non-performing loans (and
perhaps a large public-sector liability as well).  Careful assessment of credit risk and of maturity
mismatches is crucial if banks are to assist  the private sector in earning a rate of return greater
than the cost of capital.  Similarly, good disclosure and accounting standards are essential for
accurate pricing of  risk  in  both  banking and  securities markets.  When financial firms  hold
adequate regulatory capital, they have a cushion against losses and have lower incentives to take
38excessive  risks (because  more of their own  money  is at stake). Suitable  margin requirements  and
reasonable  constraints  on short selling  discourage  excessive  risk taking in derivative  markets.
These measures would be worth implementing  even in the absence of large capital inflows.
Large inflows  make the expected  costs of n=t  implementing  these safeguards  much larger.
Finally, beyond the short term, today's sophisticated  financial  markets typically  find a
way around controls or taxes on capital inflows, especially  when the incentives  to do so (e.g.,
large interest rate differentials)  are considerable. In addition, imposition  of such measures is
likely to induce  an increase  in the risk premium  on the host country's securities. Such measures
should therefore be used sparingly and selectively.  For the most part, their use should be
reserved for unfavorable  situations  where there are no good alternative  instruments  available  for
discouraging  inflows  and when bank intermediation  of capital  flows  is likely  to lead to very poor
resource allocation (because  say, there has not yet been sufficient  time or political support for
strengthening  adequately  the regulatory  and supervisory  framework).
Beyond dealing with surges of capital inflows, each host country has to decide on broader
grounds what is the optimal speed with which it wishes to move toward fuill  capital account
liberalization.
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